Ive read the June’s paper:
"(page 2)Finally, in the “representative democracy” approach, broadly followed by [25,11,27], the stakeholders can empower other stakeholders to represent them in project maintenance andsubsequently share the rewards. Given that empowering is performed via stake as recorded in theledger, representatives can be thought to form “stake pools” in analogy to the mining pools of Bitcoin.The focus of this work is to develop reward mechanisms and analyze them game theoretically for thisthird approach."
I really don’t get it! How do you hope that people will choose pools to represent them best in regard of maintenance and security of the system selecting trustworhty people as in the concept of “representative democracy” , AND that they will follow AT THE SAME TIME incentives of higher RoS they are putting in place with a0 to incentivize pool operators to get minimum amount of pledge. This leaves me clueless really.
2.2 Fair RSS’s and their Failure to Decentralise
Specifically consider the fair allocation that sets r(σi,ai,i)=σi·R
Is this the scheme that are seemingly more “fair” that is mentioned in the abstract to “converge to centralized equilibria”? If so, of course if we don’t set any limits it sounds very obvious that the optimal is to share costs across one big pool so it will be the Nash equilibrium. I hope we’re not making a straw man argument here, because it seems obvious that r(σi,ai,i)=σi·R, is bad, but it is not the case of all other “fair” reward schemes.
(page 14) To address this issue we design a reward sharing scheme that guarantees that players can attract stake from other players only if they commit substantial stake to their own pool.
Then why don’t you simply limit the delegated stake proportionally to pledge stake. rk(σ,λ)= min ( σ , 1/k , b0 * λ ). So simple, so natural! Why don’t you even mention this possibility? (at least to show it’s bad like you did with other possibilities). Didn’t you think about? Didn’t you read this post?
The objective is to design a reward scheme that provides incentives to obtain an equilibrium that compares well with the above optimal solution. On the other hand, we feel that it is important that the mechanism is not unnecessarily restrictive and all players have the “right” to become pool leaders.
Why incentives? Why not enforce that maximum delegated stake should be proportional to pledged stake? It would not unnecessarily be restrictive and all players would have the “right” to become pool leaders and to start small and grow progressively contrary to the reward scheme you propose. Why please?
The natural way to accomodate this in our scheme, would be to use the above reward functionbut apply it to σ + αλ, a weighted sum of the total pool stakeσand the allocated pool leader stake λ.
To my mind the natural way is to apply min ( σ , 1/k , b0 * λ ) . I would never have thought of σ + αλ naturally.
Quite frankly, I’ve spent crazy amounts of time on this to find nothing new. I don’t understand why authors don’t come here to explain/discuss their papers, which would be much simpler. If they don’t want to spend their time on it, then I will not keep spending mine. I’m not paid for this and my time is precious.