I’ve thought about your proposal to include an exponential factor in the formula you propose in this thread. I think I should first mention the following thing.
I would like to draw your attention towards a problem that concerns your proposal (as well as mine), if applied with no other change than the reward formula itself. It also concerns in a lesser extend, the current formula.
This problem that I would call “DDos on a pool”, allows someone who wants to mostly get rid of a staking pool, to delegate very temporarily a quite large amounts of ADA (in comparison to the pool size) to this pool a provoke a dramatic loss in RoS, so that it eventually looses all its real delegates. Once its done, the attacker undelegates its stake to the targeted pool, and then the pool is left with no delegates and no stake. This attack is of course much easier to perform on small or medium size pools.
I’ve proposed a solution to this problem, by changing the way rewards are distributed within a pool. Everything is described here:
Also it is to be noted that applying such a solution makes it less relevant to worry about how the RoS varies when Lev>Levmax (or σ>b0*s in my notation). In the context where we would apply the workaround for the “DDos on a pool” problem, for now I don’t really see any significant relevance to adding an exponential factor, i.e to choose levexp different than 1. But maybe you can show me otherwise.
I would be very interested in knowing your thoughts about this “Ddos on a pool” problem.
Thank’s a lot for your work!
Cheers!