Agreed. Right now a number of the top pools are not about pledges, but rather about a popularity/marketing presence, usually through youtube or name recognition. They have skin in the game in the form of lots of personal time invested, but not “real skin” in the game in the form of significant pledging amounts which you can lose. It’s riskier to lose real value (ADA) than personal time, imo; therefore, pledging amounts should take precedence over other considerations and these priorities should be reflected in the value of a_0.
Great point! These past few weeks will remembered as a learning period and things will evolve in a more decentralized direction
No we do not plan to retire CardanoMint at this time. We have made 6 nodes and 5 are dormant at this time. CardanoMint is being upgraded and will come back on line in about a month. All staking will go on MaximumMint (Ticker AMINT), and over flow will go into CardanoMint. We are in this for the long haul and have made long term plans for growth.
Well, I would say that time spent is not recoverable. Whereas pledge is never at risk. I get your point but …
If the Ada falls in value then the value it represents is at risk.
I meant the devaluation of the pledge amount is riskier the higher the amount pledged. If there is devaluation of ADA, it is applied proportionally to all SPOs’ pledges, but the higher the pledge, the more value in absolute terms that is lost. High-pledge SPOs are taking a significantly higher risk.
Also, the higher the SPO’s pledge, the more incentivized the SPO is to act honestly. In addition, low pool pledges with large delegated amounts facilitate expansion and centralization of pool ownership. The popular SPO with a low pledge amount can easily afford to spin up another pool cheaply. This centralization also lowers the security of the network.
Cardano’s current parameters are not conducive to decentralization and security of the network. The problem is with the delegators not the mathematics. The behavior of the delegators is much harder to calculate and parameterize so as to facilitate Cardano’s goals of decentralization and network security.
The current parameters need to be adjusted, imo.
Ignore my last post - the parts about it being about the delegators and not the math, and it being easier for low-pledge SPOs to spin-up new pools. Yes it’s easier, but not that easy when compared to a high-pledge SPO that has the same total stake amount as the low pledge pool. The issue has little to do with delegators on the SPO side; i.e., high-pledge SPOs are compensated based on risk, all other things being equal; however, it IS about the math on the delegator side of the issue. Delegators are not to blame because there is little incentivization on that side to differentiate pools based on SPO pledge amounts. I was wrong about it. I haven’t really looked into the issue yet - only superficially. I’ll study it in depth when I get a chance and come back with a more informed opinion.
The math works out well for high-pledge SPO’s on the stake pool operator side, but has negligible effects for them on the delegator side in terms of a delegator choosing a high-pledge SPO over a low-pledge SPO, regardless of the total pool stake amount. This incentivizes both low and high-pledge SPOs to compete for delegates in order to build their pools/business over time. In the beginning, it’s about survival of the hardest working SPOs as businesses to attract delegates. Of course, the low-end SPOs pledged pool operators have to work harder than high-pledge SPOs because they don’t take as big a risk money-wise and are compensated accordingly on the SPO side for taking less of a risk.
I’ll look more in depth into it and come back with calculations of expected values - my posts were based off calculations on Cardano’s mainnet stake pool reward calculator.
I still stand by this comment --> “Cardano’s current parameters are not conducive to decentralization and security of the network.” Because initially you’re pitting pools against one another on more even terms with respect to attracting delegators. If the low-pledge pool can attract more delegates than a high-pledge SPO, then he can go on to get bigger and weaken the network through expansion and centralization once he has accumulated enough to spin up more low-pledge pools.
The concept of the pledge is to ensure the person running the stake pool has skin in the game sufficient as not not work against the network. A SPO like PCT# has a very small total pledge compared to total stake controlled.
Saturation point should be directly proportional to pledge. A stake pool with low pledge should saturate far lower than a pool with higher pledge.