Beyond MVG 27.01.2026 Workshop Summary
People Present: Tevo Kask, Wepngong Maureen, Danielle Stanko, Kelvin Peter, Ken-Erik Ølmheim, Lloyd Duhon, Mark Hall, Ian Hartwell, Gintama, Input Endorsers, Nana Safo, Pedro Lucas, Ryan (Cerkoryn), Hassan, Tanny, Daniela
Purpose: Beyond MVG workshop session to capture lived experiences and desired outcomes for the Cardano Governance Measurement Framework (GMF)
Meeting notes: Miro Board Link
Workshop Video: Youtube Video link
History: Cardano Essentials Project Status: Sundae Treasury Dashboard
Workshop Onboarding
The Beyond Minimum Viable Governance (MVG) project is a community-focused initiative that uses a structured, data-driven approach to guide the continuous improvement of Cardano’s governance system.
Beyond MVG recognizes that effective governance is not achieved by structures alone, but through ongoing refinement informed by community experience, objective measurement, and practical process improvements. This workshop operationalizes that approach by creating a structured space where governance participants contribute insights that directly inform how governance performance is understood, measured, and improved.
- Shared workshop material, if people would be interested in replicating data collection and run their own workshops
- Shared overview of Governance Measurement Framework by reading Google Slides Notes
- Introduced to Miro Board activities and interaction strategies
- Quick round-table check-in where attendees identified their stakeholder roles: 15 ADA holders; 6 DReps; 3 SPOs; 1 CC Member; 3 Committee Members
Below is the list of insights we derived from our Miro Board notes, which will be submitted to the Workshop Survey for further analysis along with the other surveys and interviews.
What factors affect how quickly the Constitutional Committee can review and vote on governance actions?
- How well written are Published Governance actions?
- The number of interactions done on the Governance Action
- The time it takes for Governance Action proposers to communicate with CC members
- The amount of CC Seat positions
- Geographical differences
- Timezone differences
- Each Member has their own Operational requirements
- The Number of active proposals at that time
- The amount of supporting materials that come with proposals
- Proposal complexity and readability
- Voting Fatigue
- Lack of proposal templates
- The amount of pressure CC members get for not voting
- CC Member other responsibilities not related to the Constitution (for example, also a Drep)
- Volume of discussion in social media platforms (both privately and publicly)
- Lack of explicit requirements for CC members
- Uncertainty on how is the efficient decision making defined (quickness?, resolution?)
- The time it takes to learn set up and vote with CC keys
- Constitutional Amendment changes can affect how proposals should be reviewed
- The size of CC Member team/community
- The perceived priority by CC member
- No standard tooling to collecting feedback
- The readability of the Constitution
- Voting early may affect how others behave, depending on status (may intentionally withhold decision)
- hard to show the work of sense making
- No clear communication channels for all CC members to communicate with rest of the community
**What factors encourage or discourage SPOs from participating in governance voting? **
- Some proposals are ratified quickly before SPOs get around to voting
- Lack of tools for: batch voting, cold key management, update feed coordination, information assessment and its validation tools
- Quantity of proposals
- Lack of Proposal awareness
- Lack of incentives (somebody or something to value the choice and rational)
- Unclarity what behaviours are currently incentivised and how it affects our ecosystem
- There are a variety of reasons why someone becomes SPO, from scale to not being interested in engaging in governance at all to being part of every decision.
- Complexity of the proposals
- Quality of the constitution to help assess parameters
- Having prior experience with related activities and technology
- Change in the delegation amount
- What information is shown on SPO explorers
- How information is shown on SPO explorers (including lack of guidelines)
- Amount of time spent on governance action in the given time period (both operational and technical)
- The amount of delegation SPO currently has
- The amount of impact voting has
- Lack of incentives
- Lack of standards across tools
Voting power has become more concentrated among DReps since the role was established. What do you think most contributes to this change?
- Promoting self-voting
- Promoting individual dreps or yourself
- Lack of spaces for promoting dreps
- Prior connections with large stakeholders
- Attending spaces
- Wallets and drep platforms user experience
- Protocol Requirement to select a dRep to withdraw staking rewards leads to choosing the wallet default
- Current Incentives and Control Mechanisms
- The complexity of the governance system
- How do larger stakeholders act on the chain?
- Complexity of the proposals (how to read them and access the appendix)
- sticky delegate, delegate and forget about it until something breaks
- Lack of drep evaluations
- Lack of proposal outcomes
- Some Governance Actions are already completed and acted on before had the time to analyse effects
- Information gap between what Drep knows and what the general Drep delegator knows
Elegant Next Steps
MVG team: Decide and communicate recording publications
Anyone: Participate in the next workshops found in the Beyond MVG Linktree
MVG team: Cluster and organize stickies into themes