CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.3

Governance Constitution
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CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.3：constitution/constitution-23.md at main · cardanoz/constitution · GitHub

I.Simple summary of the changes and their rationale from Cardano Constitution v1.0 to v2.3

1. Items Removed from Constitution v1.0

(a) Expectations and Encouragement clauses

Expectations: ARTICLE III. Section 6 (off-chain governance management), ARTICLE V. Section 3 (DRep code of conduct), ARTICLE V. Section 4 (DRep selection tool), ARTICLE VII. Section 1 (CC expertise), ARTICLE VII. Section 7 (CC tool support)

Encouragement: ARTICLE VI. Section 3 (SPO code of conduct), ARTICLE VIII. Section 1 (constitutional discussion)

Rationale: These provisions were aspirational or advisory in nature (expectations/encouragements), not enforceable constitutional rules.

(b) Budget Info Action Provisions (ARTICLE III. Section 4, ARTICLE IV, ARTICLE VII. Section 4)

Rationale: The Budget Info Action mechanism was removed to simplify governance. Its requirements have been absorbed into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, ensuring oversight remains without a separate process.

(c) Obligation to Create a CC Code of Conduct (ARTICLE VII. Section 6)

Rationale: This was considered an operational detail better left to community practice rather than a constitutional mandate. The CC may still adopt codes of conduct, but it is no longer a constitutional requirement.

2. Changes and additions (excluding deletions)

(a) Overall - Fixed typos, simplified wording, and unified terminology.

Rationale: Improves readability and ensures consistency

(b) Defined Terms: - Added definitions such as Active Voting Stake, Ada Holders, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient.

Rationale: Eliminates ambiguity and ensures consistency in interpretation

(c) ARTICLE II, Section 6 – Introduced requirement that “The document hosted by such a URL shall be immutable.”

Rationale: ensure proposals cannot be altered after submission, protecting integrity and trust

(d) ARTICLE II Section 7 :Reassigned conditions previously tied to the Budget Info Action, making them mandatory at the time of Treasury Withdrawals after its removal

Rationale: strengthen accountability and transparency in the use of Treasury funds and preserve oversight and audit safeguards after removing the Budget Info Action mechanism

II.Simple summary of changes and reasons from Cardano Constitution v2.0 to v2.3

1. Editorial & Structural Improvements

  • Terminology: Standardized terms like “Cardano Community Member”, “Ada Holders”; capitalizations fixed (“Block”→“block”, “Slots”→“slots”).
  • Punctuation: Governance terms quoted consistently; removed quotes from “Should/Must”; standardized brackets, parentheses, and quotation marks.
  • Definitions: Definitions: Clarified the “Net Change Limit” (maximum treasury withdrawal per period) and refined the definition of “Stake Pool Operator” (the entity controlling cold keys).
  • Structure: Aligned section headings/numbering; clarified Treasury Withdrawal requirements; standardized quoting of governance terms and Guardrails notation.

2. Section-Specific Revisions

  • ARTICLE II Section 1: Clarifies no formal membership is needed to use or benefit from Cardano.
  • ARTICLE II Section 5: Simplifies redundant provisions regarding SPOs.
  • ARTICLE II Section 6: Simplification of wording in some provisions.
  • ARTICLE II Section 7: (1) Removed: The requirement to include the “location and identity of the recipient” in withdrawal terms, the explicit requirement to budget for audit costs, and the explicit statement that “withdrawals shall be used for the purpose set out in paragraph 1” (2) Changed: The special requirements that previously applied only to withdrawals exceeding 1,000,000 ADA in a two-year period (i.e., appointing independent auditors and publishing annual reports, designating administrators to oversee funds, and keeping funds in auditable separate accounts delegated to abstain) now apply as general requirements for all withdrawals.
  • TREASURY-04a (x): Deletes requirement for treasury withdrawal roadmaps to be approved via Info Action.

III.Evidence of widespread community reviews:

Constitution v2.0 received review and voting by 86.23% of total DRep voting power, including both Yes/No/Abstain votes.
Many DReps submitted detailed analyses publicly.
v2.3 builds on v2.0 with rational improvements and direct incorporation of on-chain feedback.
Concerns regarding insufficient discussion of the constitution have been reasonably addressed in v2.3.

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I wonder what was pros and cons were considered and what frameworks were used to motivate the change. I could advocate that CC having an obligation creates an opportunity for conflict and conflict is a source of creative power. It’s a bold point of view and I am not ready to advocate for it, for any principle taken too far becomes absurd. But having a “CC Obligation to follow a Code of Conduct” seems reasonable, why remove it?

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Thank you :folded_hands:

This is very unfortunate, but at least this provision as specified in the original Constitution is unworkable.

The original Constitution distinguished between “Constitutional Committee members” and “Constitutional Committee.”

The original Constitution stated that the “Constitutional Committee” would develop a code of conduct, and the intention was presumably to agree on a code of conduct binding on all seven members of the Constitutional Committee.

However, several former Constitutional Committee members refused to do so, making it impossible to create a code of conduct binding on all Constitutional Committee members.

Former Constitutional Committee members are still being re-elected, so this remains impossible.

Given that the Constitutional Committee refuses to abide by the provisions of the Constitution, this provision should probably be deleted.

The reason some Constitutional Committee members refuse to define a code of conduct for the Constitutional Committee is that they believe it could lead to a form of centralization.

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We can reply with Goodhearts’ words: ‘when a measure becomes the target it ceases to be a good measure’;

Decentralization in and of itself should be means but not ends. Framing suggests it enables a stakeholder to protect their interest but they can’t express it directly. Being unable to express interest directly suggests its not a fair right that is being protected but rather a “moat”, a systemic obstacle protecting an incumbent’s competitive advantage.