Input for potential minMargin settings

I’m sharing a few figures and charts here that can serve as a basis for discussion regarding a new, currently nonexistent potential minMargin value.

minMargin is expected to be technically implemented and made available starting with Djikstra HF. However, in order for it to be activated, it must be set to a specific value via a Governance Action parameter.

Let’s start with a few figures on the current status, as this forms the basis for the following simulations. Of the approximately 2,650 pools currently registered on-chain (Epoch 666), about 1,230 have produced at least one block in the last 18 epochs (3 months). For doing so, they received a reward consisting of minPoolCost (aka fixed cost) and/or the margin percentage set by the pool operator.

We will use this set of pools, with their effective rewards, for the subsequent simulations.

It can be seen that all pools combined receive approximately 1.5 million Ada per epoch in operation fees, with ~0.3 million in the form of fixed fees and 1.2 million Ada in the form of margin percentage calculations. These figures remain relatively constant over the course of the epochs but decrease significantly over the years as reserves are depleted.

What’s interesting here is that, of these 1.2M margin rewards, 1M go to the private pools that have set a 100% margin. These aren’t just private holders but also, for example, exchanges that distribute their rewards to their users on their platforms.

What’s important here is this: no matter what values are set for minPoolCost and minMargin, all 100% margin fees remain completely unaffected by them.

Before we settle on the parameters for the simulations, here is a breakdown of the stake pools based on their minPoolCost settings. Since most are set to exactly 170 or 340, these form their own categories (the largest ones), with just a few pools in between.

Assumption A1 simply assumes that all pools that previously dropped from 340 to the new minimum of 170 (less than 200 ada) will also drop to 0, and that all those that have remained at 340 so far will stay there.

The chart on the right simply hides all 100% margin pools because they aren’t affected anyway, so you can see the values more clearly.

the red dotted line shows the baseline of overall costs before any parameter is changed.

A second, purely theoretical simulation (A3) assumes that minPoolCost values are no longer calculated at all—either because the parameter is completely removed from the reward formula, or because all SPOs set its value to 0.

What we see is that the lower the minPoolCost is (which many small stake pools demand for reasons of economic competitiveness), the more room there is for a reasonable minMargin value, provided that the total cost of operator rewards is kept unchanged.

If we now apply these two assumptions to typical stake pool sizes, we can see the respective effects. The figures on the left are calculated for an average pool in each category, and those on the right represent the sum of all currently existing pools in these categories.

The screenshot below shows the simulated results for an assumed 5% minMargin.

As we can see, these simulations quickly become very diverse based on just a few very simple assumptions.

There are also significantly more complex assumptions (e.g., A2 below) in which some of the SPOs generate additional returns due to minMargin and therefore forgo a portion of their previous minPoolCost returns. This simulation is calculated individually for each pool, based on its current mPC/margin values and its active stake.

In the simulation, you can set two theoretically possible minMargin values and compare the effects (we compare 4 vs 6% minMargin).

Here’s the recording of the SPO Table talk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-HkAqA56ks

Hi Markus,

I attended the talk yesterday on YouTube without a capacity for chat as far as I could find.

The comment that I want to share is simply to be careful about interpreting data that doesn’t fit neatly into the predictions used for making the analysis, such as the experience that Chris from STR8 shared about delegations increasing when he increased minPoolCost, which is the opposite of the expected outcome. He offered the explanation that delegators do not seem to understand the parameters.

Correlation does not imply causation.

There is an observation about the Cardano community that reflects a two-way feedback loop. In the short to medium term, the ecosystem including protocol parameters is expected to shape community behaviour. However, after nine years since Cardano launched, the community has begun shaping the ecosystem instead, more and more. As time progresses, the distinct possibility exists that protocol parameters may continue becoming less and less effective in incentivizing the community, regardless of the specific numeric values.

As further support for the hypothesis that parameters in general are becoming less important to the community, I would mention that the audience for the talk yesterday discussing minMargin, which affects over 1,000 SPOs, comprised of only seven people (at least on the YouTube side).

Clearly the team has worked very hard on developing the minMargin parameter and I wish you all the best with the implementation. As always, I will update the CoinCashew Guide to reflect the change when the new parameter rolls out.

CoinCashew.io

I hope I was able to keep it as neutral as only possible both in the presentation as well as in the shared info here. The main goal of the talk particiapnts was to start discussing various aspects early on … months before minMargin is even available.

yes I’m aware the streams don’t reach that many users on Youtube. We still keep that output channel for all the streamed round table talks because it ends up in long lasting and indexed content, everyone can visit without the requirement to have an X account. The table talks are always also broadcasted via X, where they have way shorter visibility on the timeline, but a much wider reach.