Intersect RFP Process Discussion:Let's Talk Budget (Charles Hoskinson: ) X-Space Summary

This is an AI summary for those who don’t have time to listen to the entire X-Space.


Below is a summary of the main points and flow of the Twitter Space discussion regarding the Cardano budget process and the proposal for an RFP (Request for Proposal) by Intersect. Charles Hoskinson (hereafter “Charles”) and several Cardano community members participated in the conversation.


1. Background and Purpose of the Space

  • Charles started this Twitter Space to discuss Cardano’s upcoming budget process, prompted by Intersect’s suggestion that all funds be distributed through an RFP managed entirely by Intersect.
  • Charles strongly opposes the idea that Intersect would hold all the funds and manage the budget (effectively serving as a single gatekeeper).
  • Instead, he insists that DReps (delegated representatives under CIP-1694) must retain control over final budget decisions, as they are the only group directly empowered and elected (or delegated to) by the ADA holders.

2. What is Intersect?

  • Intersect is a membership-based nonprofit organization modeled on open-source foundations like the Linux Foundation or Apache Foundation.
  • However, it is relatively new in the Cardano ecosystem, and Charles questions if it:
    1. Has the technical expertise and track record to manage large-scale software or research projects.
    2. Possesses a legitimate democratic mandate from the Cardano community to hold decision-making authority for the entire ecosystem’s budget.
  • Charles points out:
    • Intersect shouldn’t be deciding the entire roadmap or the distribution of funding.
    • “Its role should be more like audit/coordination rather than being ‘judge, jury, and executioner.’”
    • Managing RFPs alone would give Intersect too much central power, contrary to Cardano’s decentralized vision.

3. Concerns About an RFP Approach Led by Intersect

Charles and other participants highlighted these issues:

  1. Over-centralization

    • Having Intersect receive a lump sum from the Cardano Treasury and decide allocations for all projects would create a monopolistic “one-stop” power center.
    • This contradicts Cardano’s decentralized ethos and the on-chain governance model (CIP-1694) that empowers DReps.
  2. Lack of Expertise

    • Intersect lacks a substantial track record in large-scale software development, academic research, or delivering ecosystem products to market.
    • Example: IOHK (IOG) has been researching and developing Cardano for 7+ years with numerous peer-reviewed papers and major software releases. Intersect has no comparable experience.
  3. Bureaucracy and Slow-Down

    • A classic government-style RFP process often means excessive paperwork, delays, and “lowest-bid-wins” pitfalls.
    • The crypto industry moves quickly; a 6–12 month lag in awarding funds can be highly detrimental.
    • “Racing to the bottom” in pricing could ignore critical factors like expertise, community trust, and existing infrastructure.
  4. No Legitimate Electoral Basis

    • Under CIP-1694, DReps were given authority over budgeting and governance, having been delegated by ADA holders.
    • Intersect is not an elected body; therefore, letting Intersect control the treasury contradicts the spirit of on-chain governance.

4. The Role of DReps and the Ideal Budget Flow

  • DReps (Delegated Representatives) are those who have been delegated voting power under CIP-1694. They hold formal authority to approve or reject budget proposals.
  • Charles’s view on the ideal budget process:
    1. Multiple budget proposals (complete or partial) are submitted by the various teams, projects, companies, or labs in the ecosystem.
    2. DReps reconcile those proposals in a workshop or meeting, merging them into a single comprehensive budget plan.
    3. Proposals also include audit/oversight mechanisms. (The concept of “audit pairing” means each funding request must also specify how they will be audited or validated.)
    4. DReps vote on the unified budget. If approved, it moves to the Constitutional Committee for final sign-off in a bicameral structure.
  • This approach ensures:
    • The treasury remains decentralized.
    • Expertise is recognized (projects/teams with proven track records can propose funding requests).
    • No single body acts as gatekeeper for all funds.

5. Interaction with Existing Entities (Catalyst, Foundation, etc.)

  • Project Catalyst has traditionally funded small-to-medium proposals via grants. It’s suited for “new ideas” or “early-stage” teams but is less appropriate for large/long-term R&D due to heavy reporting requirements and unstable, piecemeal funding cycles.
  • Cardano Foundation has also existed from early on, but its board is not directly elected by ADA holders.
  • IOHK (IOG) is a private company that has done core Cardano development and research for years but does not hold the final authority under CIP-1694.
  • The key principle remains: no single organization has absolute authority. The DReps must evaluate budget proposals, including those from Catalyst, IOHK, or other major players.

6. Charles’s Proposed Shortcut: “Coalitions” for Core Development

  • Charles suggests forming a coalition of major ecosystem players—e.g., IOHK, TxPipe, DC Spark, SundaySwap, Aiken, etc.—to submit a unified “big budget” proposal.
    • This proposal covers core dev needs, marketing, growth, oversight frameworks, etc., all in one package.
    • DReps can then discuss and finalize the package more swiftly rather than dealing with dozens of separate, uncoordinated proposals.
  • Upside:
    • Maintains speed so that important ecosystem development is not stalled.
    • Utilizes trusted teams who have proven contributions to Cardano.
  • Downside:
    • DReps must still be informed enough to ensure fair coverage of smaller projects and not just rubber-stamp large proposals.
  • Charles argues that for this first large budget cycle, hitting ~70–80% efficiency quickly is acceptable. The process can be improved in subsequent years.

7. Supporting and Compensating DReps

  • DReps will need time and expertise to analyze proposals effectively.
  • The community must address whether/how to fund or compensate DReps and/or provide staff to handle extensive review and due diligence.
  • Charles acknowledges potential risks:
    • No compensation → incompetent or passive DReps.
    • Too much compensation → risk of corruption or unwieldy bureaucracy.
    • Balance is needed, and it can be integrated into the budget (e.g., covering travel/workshop costs for in-person budget summits).

8. Main Takeaways & Next Steps

  1. Charles opposes an Intersect-led RFP that centralizes all budget authority.
  2. DReps should gather and assemble a comprehensive budget by reconciling proposals from the ecosystem.
  3. Oversight/audit must be embedded in each funded proposal.
  4. This year’s approach need not be perfect. Avoid “analysis paralysis”—Cardano should move forward swiftly and refine the process next cycle.
  5. If Intersect insists on a single RFP process, IOHK may withdraw from Cardano development due to the fundamental conflict with decentralization.
  6. Charles reiterates: “DReps have the final say—please organize, talk to each other, and drive the process.”

9. Overall Message

  • Core Principle: Under CIP-1694, DReps are mandated to decide the budget.
  • Problem: Intersect’s push for a single RFP funnel contradicts decentralization and real on-chain governance.
  • Charles’s Advice:
    1. DReps must take the lead, gather proposals (especially from established contributors), and craft a unified budget.
    2. Include a suitable oversight mechanism to ensure transparency.
    3. Aim for a workable plan quickly, then iterate yearly.
  • Critical Juncture: The process of budget formation will test how Cardano can manage its large Treasury effectively and responsibly, without sliding into centralization or dysfunction.

In Short

“DReps, not Intersect, should finalize Cardano’s budget.
A single RFP run by Intersect is too centralized.
Speed is essential—use a coalition approach for key dev & marketing.
Then, refine everything in future cycles.”

以下は、スペース全体の流れと主要な論点を整理したものです。長文ですが、ポイントごとに区切ってまとめています。なお、この音声スペースは「Cardanoにおける予算策定とRFP(入札・提案依頼方式)の是非」について、Charles Hoskinson氏(以下「Charles」)を中心にコミュニティメンバーが議論した内容です。


1. スペースの背景と目的

  • CharlesがTwitterスペースを立ち上げ、Cardanoの今後の予算策定について議論。
  • 特に、Intersectという団体(Cardanoコミュニティのメンバーシップ組織)が「RFP(Request for Proposal)方式で予算を一括管理しよう」と発言していたことがきっかけ。
  • Charlesは「RFPをIntersectが一括管理する」という形に強く反対し、“DReps(デリゲートされた投票権を持つ代表者)”こそが予算の最終的な決定を行うべきだと主張。

2. Intersectとは何か

  • Intersectは、Linux FoundationやApache Foundationのようなオープンソースプロジェクトの支援組織をモデルに設計された非営利のメンバーシップ団体。
  • しかし、Cardanoコミュニティから見るとまだ新しく、「大規模な予算を裁くような実績・専門性・民主的な選任プロセスがない」段階だというのがCharlesの見解。
  • Charles曰く、
    • 「IntersectはCardano全体の『ロードマップ策定』や『資金配分の最終判断』を担うような“強い権限”を持つべきではない」
    • 「Intersectは、あくまで“監査”や“コーディネーション”など補助的な役割にとどまるのが望ましい」
    • 「にもかかわらず、IntersectがRFP(入札・提案募集)を通じて、全予算を握ろうとするのは危険」
      と強調している。

3. IntersectによるRFP方式への懸念

Charlesと他の参加者が主張した主な懸念は以下のとおり。

  1. 中央集権的になり過ぎる

    • Intersectが予算をまとめて受け取り、「どのプロジェクトにいくら割り当てるか」を一手に決定する形は“Judge, Jury, and Executioner”(判事・陪審・執行人を兼ねる)という極度の集権を生む。
    • これはCardanoが目指す「分散化」と矛盾し、ガバナンスモデル(CIP-1694)が示すDRepsによる民主的プロセスを損なう。
  2. 専門性の欠如

    • Intersectはまだ大きなソフトウェアや学術研究を主導した実績がほぼない。
    • 例:IOHK(以下IOとも表記)は7年以上にわたりCardanoを開発・研究し、科学論文や大規模プロダクトの実装をこなしてきた。
    • 「大規模予算の査定・技術審査を行う能力が、今のIntersectにあるのか」との疑問が大きい。
  3. RFPがもたらす官僚主義・速度低下

    • 政府調達などでよくある“競争入札方式”は、書類作成・審査・議論が膨大になり、スピード感が失われる。
    • ブロックチェーン業界では、半年や1年の遅れが致命的な遅れにつながりかねない。
    • さらに「最低価格競争」が起きると質の低いベンダーが勝ったり、既存で信頼のある開発チームが不当にはじかれたりする恐れもある。
  4. 正当な“選挙による権限”がない

    • SIP-1694によってDRepsが“予算決定の権限”を付与されたのに、Intersectが“実質的な財布の紐”を握るのはコンセンサスと乖離している。
    • Charles曰く「Intersectは投票で選ばれた組織ではない。ならば、財源を一手に握る資格はない」。

4. DRepsの役割と予算決定の本来の流れ

  • **DReps(Delegated Representatives)**とは、ADA保有者から投票権をデリゲートされた代表者たち。新ガバナンス(SIP-1694)では、DRepsが予算案の採決権を持つ。

  • Charlesの主張:

    1. 複数の候補予算案や部分的提案を「各コミュニティ・企業・研究組織」から提出してもらう。
    2. DRepsは「合議」でそれらを突合し、一つの包括的な予算案にまとめる。
    3. 監査・評価方法(オーバーサイト)とセットで承認する。
      • 「監査とセット」(ペアにする)という考え方:
        予算を受け取る提案には必ず監査役(専門機関・企業・スマートコントラクトなど)を同時に提案させ、「成果物が規定どおりか」を検証する仕組みを組み込む。
    4. そのうえでDRepsが投票→合格ならば予算が執行される。
    5. 合格した予算案は、最終的に憲法委員会(Constitutional Committee)の承認も必要。(二院制のような仕組み)
  • このフローが「Cardanoにおいて本来あるべき予算策定」の姿だというのがCharlesの基本的見解。


5. Catalystや既存組織とのすみ分け

  • Project Catalystは、コミュニティの小~中規模の提案を「助成金(グラント)」的に支援する仕組みとして機能してきた。
    • あくまで「試験的なアイデア」や「新規プロジェクトの初期段階」をサポートする場合に有効。
    • しかし、Catalystは大規模・長期のR&Dプロジェクトの予算を扱うには不向き。報告書類などの事務量が多すぎるという声や、継続的な資金供給には不便との声がある。
  • Cardano Foundationは昔からあるが、理事会メンバーがコミュニティ選挙で選ばれるわけではない。
  • **IOHK(IOG)**はCardanoの中核開発を長く担ってきたが、同社はあくまで1つの民間企業であり、最終意思決定を担う立場ではない。
  • こうした既存組織も含め、誰が何を監査・執行するかは「複数案を出し、DRepsが合議して最終決定する」形が原則になる。

6. Charlesの提案する近道:「連合(コア開発など)でまとめて予算を組む」案

  • **「コア開発や主要DApp開発企業で“連合”を組み、ひとまとめに予算を組むべき」**というアイデア。
    • 例:IOHK、TxPipe、DC Spark、EMURGO系、SundaySwap、Aikenなど、すでにCardanoで実績・貢献度のある複数組織が連携して予算計画を作り、DRepsに提案する。
    • そうすることで、「プロダクト開発」だけでなく「マーケティング、成長戦略、監査方法」が包含された、ある程度まとまった提案ができる。
    • その提案をベースにしてDRepsが必要な修正・加筆などをし、「大枠の予算」を早めに決めてしまう。あとは来年以降のサイクルでブラッシュアップしていく。
    • 長所: 大規模開発が中断されず、スピード感を損なわない。
    • 短所: 全体観をDRepsがしっかり把握しないと、合議が形骸化する恐れ。
      ただし、Charlesは「今回(最初の年)は完璧を求めず、スピードを優先し、来年の予算でさらに改善すればよい」と強調。

7. DRepsのためのサポートと報酬問題

  • DRepsが細かい審査を行うには「専門知識」と「時間的リソース」が必要。
  • 「DRepsの活動に対して予算を組むかどうか」「どうやってDRepsを支援するか」は大きな論点。
  • Charlesの見解:
    • DRepsを無報酬にすると、質の高い検討が不可能。
    • 一方で報酬を高く設定すれば不正が起きるかもしれないし、DRepsの肥大化リスクがある。
    • しかし最低限、DRepsが集まるワークショップ経費などは必要だろう、と言及。
    • 具体的には「1~2週間の集中合宿・ワークショップ」を実施し、対面で合意形成を図る方法を示唆し、自分(IOHK)がそのコストを支援する用意もあると明言。

8. まとめと今後のアクション

  1. IntersectがRFPを主導し、全予算を牛耳る案にはCharlesは断固反対。
    • Cardanoにとって有害であり、分散化の理念に反すると非難。
  2. DRepsが主導して各予算提案をまとめ、合議で1つの予算案に集約することが基本路線。
    • すでに実績ある開発団体・企業は連合を作り、一括提案をしてスピード感を確保する。
  3. 監査(オーバーサイト)もあわせて提案し、透明性を確保する。
    • 必要に応じて外部コンサルや監査企業、スマートコントラクトを活用。
  4. 今回(初年度)は完璧主義に陥らず、最低限のコンセンサスと速度を優先する。
    • 来年以降も毎年予算は組み直すことになるので、まずは「止まらないこと」が最重要。
  • Charlesは「2~4か月以内に予算をまとめたい」「もしIntersectがRFPを強行するならIOHKは参加せず、開発をたたんでしまう可能性すらある」と明言。
  • 最後にCharlesは「これはコミュニティ全体にかかわることであり、“DRepsこそが予算を決める本来の権力者”。積極的に集まって話し合いを始めてほしい」と強いメッセージを残してスペースを締めくくった。

9. 全体の要旨

  • 大前提: Cardanoでは、SIP-1694によって “DReps”が予算承認などを担う主体として位置づけられた。
  • 問題点: IntersectがRFP方式でまとめて予算を管理したがる流れがあり、Charlesや多くのコアコミュニティメンバーは「これは分散型ガバナンスの理念に反する」と強く反発。
  • Charlesの提案:
    1. まずはDRepsが積極的に集い、各プロジェクト・企業から上がってきた「予算要求案」を合議でまとめあげる。
    2. 監査体制もセットで組み込む。
    3. 時間をかけ過ぎるとエcosystemの停滞を招くので、今年度分は大枠を素早く決め、来年度以降で改良する。
  • 最終的なポイント:
    • 「Cardanoは大きな資金(トレジャリー)を使いこなしてさらに成長できるか」を占う重要局面。
    • DRepsの行動と、コミュニティ全体が“どう意思決定を進めるか”が鍵となる。

以上が、おおまかな「このスペースで交わされた議論の整理」です。要するに、

「予算策定権は投票で選ばれたDRepsが持つべき」
「RFP方式を一括で管理しようとするのは中央集権化の危険が大きい」
「まずは主要開発・プロジェクト連合がDRepsと連携し、今期の予算をまとめあげるべき」

というのがCharles含む多くの参加者の結論的メッセージとなっています。

4 Likes

Thanks Yuta.

The “coalition” @IOHK_Charles speaks of here just ultimately results in the intent of Intersect (originally). Right?

Why should, for instance, an unelected coalition of IOHK, TxPipe, SundaeSwap, etc. be treated any different than what Intersect is today? You’re just taking from one (needed) centralized entity in the process and giving to another to do the same thing, but also making it (further down) worse.

“to submit a unified “big budget” proposal” - which - to be frank doesn’t make it swifter because now you’ve rolled up things like core dev in with marketing and growth and not everyone can agree on what needs to be where.

It was kind of the point of the “buckets” - so you could have those specialized groups/areas where people want to focus in on.

We do have DReps that consider a unified budget DOA because it includes issues they do not care about within it. Just a fact.

“This year’s approach need not be perfect. Avoid “analysis paralysis”—Cardano should move forward swiftly and refine the process next cycle.” - That’s a given, and I think Intersect deserves a little benefit of the doubt and understanding that the approach won’t be perfect from them either.

Can’t say I’m strongly for or against really anything in the broader discussion. It’s rallied up some opponents of Intersect (fine), and it’s discouraged many who are trying to fix things and come up with viable solutions (not fine with).

If it’s truly in the hands of the DReps to sort this out, let it be. Otherwise, seems like (per this summary), it’s going in circles.

It’s frustrating because intersect was doing the only rational thing it could have done given that there is no framework in place. If Intersect had come out with a budget having already picked who was going to get paid for each project and presented it to DReps that way everyone would have thrown their hands in the air demanding transparancy as to why those companies/individuals were picked and we would end up having several dozens of budget proposals start popping up with alternate versions and we would be unable to pass anything. I really understand the allergic reaction that everyone is having to RFPs but then folks are going to have to be willing to fund full time DReps to sort through this mess and we currently do not have even close to an acceptable framework to keep that concept from becoming wildly abused. I’m very concerned that we are headed into the pay to play, lobbyist style system quickly. There is no cap on delegation, no agreement on DRep funding, no KYC requirement and anti abuse frameworks to become a DRep. We have a lot of work to do. Best roll up our sleeves because it’s going to get bumpy

What can I say… some very valid points being raised by Charles there, but all of these have been brought up by other community members for weeks and months now and it is straight up hilarious to see how the community only recognizes them as valid if he brings them up. This is not what decentralization should look like. Just the opposite. Shame on all of you who disregarded them earlier just to urgently wanting to discuss them now. Do better.

With that being said, I’d urge everyone to at least question Charles motivation to do an 180 on himself here, as valid as some of the points might be. If you followed the Constitutional Convention, you know exactly that the issue of the sole administrator / gatekeeper being a bad idea was brought up and that he himself shut it down. Lets proceed with caution maybe when it comes to his agenda.

What he now proposes is basically Catalyst with more funding, a pre-selection process to prioritize and ensure the overall budget doesn’t hit the NCL and dReps as control mechanism and voters, which is how governance was set up in the first place.
The audit part is a bit unclear, because it seems unfeasible to me that every team or company submitting a proposal will be able to even find an independent auditor, let alone on short notice.

“Dreps should gather” or take the lead is a great statement to make for Charles, but the reality is: Intersect is basically broke at this point and despite all the money spent, we don’t have the processes nor the tooling or platforms to do any of this in a productive way and have a core developer threatening to withdraw from development.

So, yeah, in short: We’re kinda fucked.

3 Likes

Because they are qualified, have a vested financial interest in Cardano as active stakeholders and a year-long proven track record of delivering products, running at least sustainable companies, and knowing the ins and outs of developing in this ecosystem by first hand experience?

None of this is necessarily true for Intersect or any of its working groups.
(it is true though for Pragma, which is essentially this kind of coalition. Which is why I always advocated for them to submit their proposals for treasury funds directly and not through Intersect at all)

I figure the unified budget has to be there at some point, at least to some estimated extend, because it has to align with the NCL and we should avoid a situation where this becomes a first-come-first-serve race, which will only lead to half-assed proposals and unnecessary spending.

There should however still be individual votes on buckets / proposals, because we can’t put everything on hold in development e.g. just because there is a great drama-debate sparked by some position in the marketing budget.

4 Likes

Just to be clear, I didn’t share this because I agreed with everything Charles said, but because I thought the developers were going to leave and it would have a big impact on the budget process, I shared it with people who would find it difficult to watch the 2 hour X space
:pray:

I think all of the replies contain valid points :pray:

4 Likes

Didn’t take it that way and thanks for putting it together Yuta.

1 Like

It’s something we’ll have to ultimately figure out. An issue I have is continuing to drag builders through governance processes as the only ones capable of dealing with it. Doesn’t seem like they’d get anything done - nor am I sure how you’d address conflicts of interest for competing products to those teams.

Just seems like the RFP process could be dealt with differently, but the committees themselves should remain community elected still and not as hung up on purely developer/etc/ qualifications.

A solid community member would be able to take their (presumably campaigned) vision for Cardano’s future and align the projects presented before them (once through an RFP process) . It’s just as difficult sometimes to align opportunities to builders, and not just in terms of priorities either. Not sure if that fully tracks in my response, just feels like there’s a layer missing in here where teams can and should contribute and collaborate with committees that are in place (elections aside).