Hi, I hope this is the right place for this discussion. I watched the Treasuries whiteboard with Bingsheng Zhang and then skimmed the published paper, but I couldn’t find an answer to my question.
In short, the question is could a “sufficiently large” project endorsed by the community halt progress on the protocol/project.
Given some a set of projects p1,p2,…p6, and each one has an estimated cost of c1, c2, …, c6. So, for the purposes of illustration, I’m going to assign the costs of each project as follows:
Then, let’s assume for the purposes of illustration that our amount in our treasury t=40, and increases by 40 each treasury epoch.
Then, our treasury vote occurs and each vote is “yes”, meets the 10% threshold, and is voted in preference order p1,p2,p3,…p6.
So, p1 and p2 would be funded for 20, and per the current discussion and whitepaper implementation p3 would not be funded because it has a cost of 200 and the treasury only has 20 funds remaining.
Now, in the next treasury epoch, the treasury pool has 60, and everyone votes. Assuming the preferential order remains the same, the projects would be p3,p4,…p6.
And so on, until, given the current algorithm, the work would be funded.
So, given a sufficiently large cn for some project pn that everyone is in favor of, could that project potentially halt the progress of the project for a damaging amount of time? (e.g. “this project is dead!”)
Or, should additional protocols/research be performed in reserving some percentage of the remaining treasury towards approved projects that could not be funded, while still funding projects below that threshold.
For instance, in the example above, if 50% of the remaining treasury is reserved, p4 would still be funded, but p5 would not, and there would be 15 funds remaining in the treasury after the first treasury epoch.
Hope that all made sense, would love to hear your thoughts, or if this is discussed somewhere that I’m not aware of.