Thank you for your feedback, we will forward it to the appropriate Working Group or chat for consideration.
・Community Hubs → Feedback has been sent to the Community Hub WG. Extensive redefinition of KPIs etc. is currently underway and feedback may be affected by this.
・Education programs → This will be discussed at MCC.
・Catalyst RetroPGF → Feedback has been sent to the Catalyst WG.
・Catalyst Operations and improvements → Feedback has been sent to the Catalyst WG.
Hello All,
The Innovation Budget Proposal is updated today with the latest MCC budget v.3.9.7. per approval of the MCC Committee. Change Log is added at the end of budget proposal.
Requested budget: ₳ 76,836,800
Please check it out:
These budget discussions by the working groups are taking months instead of weeks. If they had happened in a timely manner, there would have been enough time for 3 Funds. If you approve just two, we can have the same problem next year.
We cannot be discussing the budget division of the 2025 budget during 4 months of 2025. We should discuss this in advance. If someone says that the 2026 budget will be discussed from July 2025 and defined by December 2025, I think that is reasonable.
Catalyst already had a hiatus of almost a year in 2020, where many people left the ecosystem. We need more predictability here. Catalyst is the main way for the community to obtain grants. If this source dries up due to bureaucratic reasons, the ecosystem and community members pay a high price.
I would like to have access to KPIs related to how many people leave the Cardano ecosystem due to excessive bureaucracy and delays.
Are there other channels where these discussions are taking place?
I am aware that there are calls, working group meetings, but I am referring here to spaces where the community provides feedback to the working group.
I am asking this because I could not find another channel with significant community input and here there is almost no community feedback in over a month. There are clearly contributions from some community members, but I would have expected to find much more. The polls held contain an extremely low sample size and this is worrying in my opinion.
The “committees” mainly organise in the Intersect Discord server and a lot seems to be done in the gazillion Zoom calls organised there. 
Don’t think that that exists. Expectation is probably that people who want to give feedback will come either here or there.
The hiatus was over a year between Fund9 voting in August 2022 and Fund10 voting ending in September 2023.
Do you really think Catalyst, its projects and results are that valuable to Cardano on average?
What does it say about an ecosystem if things only happen when there is free money to be grabbed?
Yep, I got confused about the hiatus year.
Many promising projects started on Catalyst, as the lack of strong VC investment or alternative grant models in the Cardano ecosystem makes it the only viable option for many. Intersect Grants, in my view, is almost irrelevant at this point.
While Catalyst has funded hundreds of proposals, my experience since Fund 2 shows a recurring issue: underdelivery. This is a complex problem with no single cause. However, the introduction of milestone-based funding now provides better oversight and helps verification of the reputation of funded proposals.
Catalyst has faced problems from the start, and many persist. While some solutions are being implemented (Voices an an example), the slow pace of change has driven people away from both the project and the Cardano ecosystem.
If viable funding alternatives existed, I’d be less forgiving of Catalyst’s flaws. But private sector support for Cardano-based projects remains weak, and without Catalyst, the outlook seems bleak.
For years, some have suggested creating a competitor to Catalyst, but none have materialized.
We can complain about the network taxes being used to fund projects, of course, and it is natural that we seek to optimize the use of treasury resources. But what is the benefit for Cardano if we attack the only significant source of funding for project development?
Instead of simply blocking resources for Catalyst, I prefer the option of finding viable funding solutions and then, after there is competition, we can choose the best ones.
I do not believe that removing Catalyst from the scene would force people to find a solution, I believe that it would scare people away to other blockchains, in my view this would stagnate development on Cardano in a dangerous way.
Of course, all of this is just my personal opinion.
Thanks Rodrigo for your insightful views.
My team is planning to submit a proposal for a Catalyst alternative. I would love to get your and everyone’s feedback.
The Cardano ecosystem stands at a critical juncture in its evolution. With over $150 million allocated through Project Catalyst to fund 2,161 projects, we have witnessed both the tremendous potential and inherent limitations of our current funding mechanisms. As Cardano matures, so too must our approach to fostering innovation and allocating resources within the ecosystem.
This proposal introduces Extended Quadratic Funding (EQF) as a complementary funding mechanism to Project Catalyst—designed not to replace but to enhance Cardano’s innovation landscape by addressing five critical limitations in the current system: centralized voting power, limited treasury resources, inadequate impact reporting, unclear return on investment, and inefficient milestone management.
Extended Quadratic Funding combines the mathematical elegance of quadratic voting with reputation-based mechanisms and decentralized governance to create a more equitable, efficient, and sustainable funding ecosystem. Our approach draws inspiration from successful quadratic funding implementations in other blockchain ecosystems while incorporating unique elements tailored to Cardano’s specific needs and values.
Project Catalyst represents one of the largest decentralized innovation funds in the blockchain space, demonstrating Cardano’s commitment to community-driven development. Through multiple funding rounds, it has supported a diverse array of projects spanning DeFi protocols, educational initiatives, infrastructure improvements, and real-world applications.
However, as the ecosystem has grown, several structural limitations have become increasingly apparent:
Recent research by Nelson et al. (2024) has quantified what many community members have observed anecdotally: voting power in Project Catalyst is highly concentrated. Their analysis revealed that in 97.5% of voting coalition scenarios, just 1.5% of wallets could determine the final outcome. This concentration reached its apex in Fund 13, where a single entity—the Cardano Foundation—effectively controlled most funding decisions.
This concentration creates several problems:
While substantial, the Cardano treasury is not infinite. As demand for funding increases with ecosystem growth, the treasury faces mounting pressure. The current model, which relies exclusively on treasury funds without additional capital sources, constrains the number and scope of projects that can receive support.
Furthermore, the all-or-nothing approach to project funding creates inefficiencies: projects either receive their requested amount or nothing at all, lacking mechanisms for partial funding based on broader community support.
Despite allocating over $150 million to date, Project Catalyst lacks standardized mechanisms for tracking and reporting the impact of funded projects. This creates several challenges:
The current funding model operates as a one-way flow of resources: treasury funds are allocated to projects without mechanisms for value to flow back to the ecosystem. While this grant-based approach is appropriate for many public goods, it fails to capture potential value from successful commercial projects that achieve significant traction or profitability.
This limitation:
Project Catalyst’s milestone review process has become a significant bottleneck, with funded teams often waiting months for payments during review periods. This centralized, opaque process creates:
Extended Quadratic Funding addresses these limitations through five interconnected innovations:
At the core of our proposal is a novel voting mechanism that balances financial contribution with demonstrated community impact. The EQF voting power calculation multiplies:
This dual mechanism ensures that while financial contribution remains important, its influence is both:
For example:
This system significantly reduces the plutocratic effect of the current one-coin-one-vote system while maintaining “skin in the game” principles through financial contribution requirements.
To protect the integrity of this system, we implement robust Sybil resistance through Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) verification powered by Hyperledger Identus (formerly Atala PRISM). This system:
We employ three complementary strategies to prevent collusion:
Together, these mechanisms make collusion economically irrational while preserving legitimate voting influence.
The Extended Quadratic Funding model transforms the treasury from the sole funding source to a catalytic multiplier of community resources. Here’s how it works:
For example, consider two projects:
Though both raised the same amount, Project A would receive significantly more from the matching pool due to its broader support base—potentially 10× more.
This mechanism creates powerful incentives:
U.S. donors gain an additional benefit through our 501(c)(3) structure, making donations tax-deductible—creating unique incentives even outside the cryptocurrency ecosystem.
All projects funded through the Extended Quadratic Funding mechanism must participate in standardized impact reporting. This includes:
This comprehensive reporting system enables:
To ensure long-term treasury sustainability, we implement a voluntary contribution system where funded projects that achieve commercial success share value with the ecosystem. This operates through several mechanisms:
These contributions flow into a dedicated treasury separate from the main Cardano treasury but governed by the same community. This creates a virtuous cycle where successful projects help fund future innovation.
Our target is to achieve a 3× ROI within 10 years across the entire portfolio. While ambitious, this benchmark is actually conservative compared to traditional venture capital expectations, reflecting our balanced approach to funding both public goods and commercial applications.
Our milestone management system addresses the payment delays and dispute resolution challenges of the current system through a decentralized approach with built-in incentives:
This system creates a self-balancing mechanism that rewards speed and accuracy while providing clear escalation paths when needed. Based on pilot implementation data, we project an average payment processing time of less than 7 days—a dramatic improvement over the current months-long delays.
Our implementation will be executed through a carefully staged approach, designed to progressively test, validate, and scale the Extended Quadratic Funding (EQF) mechanism:
Total Funding Request: $1.5 Million
Funding Allocation Principles:
Extended Quadratic Funding is not intended to replace Project Catalyst but to complement it—creating a more diverse innovation funding ecosystem within Cardano. Just as the introduction of a Rust node alongside the Haskell implementation strengthens Cardano’s technical infrastructure through diversity, multiple funding mechanisms create a more resilient innovation landscape.
By addressing the five key limitations of the current system—centralized voting power, limited treasury resources, inadequate impact reporting, unclear return on investment, and inefficient milestone management—Extended Quadratic Funding will unlock new potential within the Cardano ecosystem.
The insights gained through this implementation will not only directly benefit funded projects but also provide valuable data and experience that could inform future improvements to Project Catalyst itself and potentially broader Cardano governance mechanisms like Voltaire.
In an ecosystem built on scientific rigor and evidence-based improvement, Extended Quadratic Funding represents the logical next step in Cardano’s funding evolution—maintaining our commitment to decentralization while enhancing effectiveness, transparency, and sustainability.
I’ll be doing two AMA sessions related to this proposal. We would love to get your feedback!
Details:
Sorry for the late response, next is the Catalyst WG.
Also, now a new Budget process has been started. Catalysts must apply here, and Catalyst-like projects, like Socious, can also apply.
Thank you so much I think this is a great suggestion, just a few questions 
Can you tell me the formula for the Impact Score?
Who will approve changes to the Impact Score formula?
Who will do the KYC?
Are there plans to get feedback from the Catalyst team?
What is the definition of coordinated voting? Who will decide it?
Can you explain a bit more about the following: What does it cost to be a voter?
Economic Disincentives: Our fee structure makes vote-splitting unprofitable:
Platform fees decrease with donation size
This makes it more expensive to split funds across multiple accounts
Does this structure allow for a variable amount of release from the matching pool depending on how much donations are raised? For example, in the extreme case of a $1 million matching pool round, if only one project receives $20 in donations, will that project get the $1 million?
If it’s all distributed to projects, who will pay the reviewers’ fees?
“Our target is to achieve a 3× ROI within 10 years across the entire portfolio.” Does this assume that the $4.5 million in contributions will come from projects after funding is raised?
Hello Mr. Seira, I have been following your project for several months, I was one of the Milestone Reviewers of the project and I was(am) very excited since I started reading and understanding what you were developing.
I really like the concept presented in the message, I think it addresses several gaps that exist in Catalyst, some from the beginning and others more recent.
I would love to contribute to this project if you need any help.
Hi Rodrigo! Thank you for your kind words! Yes, let’s chat:) Please join our discord:)
Hi Yuta,
Thank you so much for your questions! Let me answer your questions below.
Can you tell me the formula for the Impact Score?
Please find the details here:
Who will approve changes to the Impact Score formula?
Socious DAO members will be able to change the formula in the future.
Who will do the KYC?
For now, our KYC partner is Didit.
Are there plans to get feedback from the Catalyst team?
We’ve already received great feedback from Kriss from the Catalys team.
What is the definition of coordinated voting? Who will decide it?
Please see the details here: FAQ | Socious Fund
Can you explain a bit more about the following: What does it cost to be a voter?
Please find an answer here:
Economic Disincentives: Our fee structure makes vote-splitting unprofitable:
Platform fees decrease with donation size
This makes it more expensive to split funds across multiple accounts
Please find the details here: FAQ | Socious Fund
Does this structure allow for a variable amount of release from the matching pool depending on how much donations are raised? For example, in the extreme case of a $1 million matching pool round, if only one project receives $20 in donations, will that project get the $1 million?
Please find the answer here: FAQ | Socious Fund
”matching pool funds are capped at a project’s requested amount (which is limited by each round’s maximum)”
If it’s all distributed to projects, who will pay the reviewers’ fees?
Reviewers receive incentives in the form of SOCIO tokens.
“Our target is to achieve a 3× ROI within 10 years across the entire portfolio.” Does this assume that the $4.5 million in contributions will come from projects after funding is raised?
Yes, that’s our KPI.
Hi Yuta, do you know if all types of proposals are allowed? The text is not very clear. I assume they are proposals related to governance. What did you understand?
Hi Rodrigo, As far as I understand, basically any proposal is allowed. Grants, core development, marketing, governance, any kind of proposal can be submitted through this form The final decision is up to DRep.
Hi Seira, Thank you so much A few additional questions
Can you explain how consensus works in Socious DAO?
I checked this but I couldn’t find the specific definition and who will decide, but is it correct to understand that the definition is any attempt that may potentially abuse this system, and that the judge is the Socious team?
FAQ | Socious Fund
The fee doesn’t seem that high, so would this make vote-splitting unprofitable…? Any quick analysis?
Hello All,
The Innovation Budget Proposal is updated today with the latest MCC budget v.3.9.8. per approval of the MCC Committee. Change Log is added at the end of budget proposal.
Requested budget: ₳ 76,996,800
Please check it out: 2025 Draft Bucket Budget - details sheet (work-in-progress) - Google Sheets
Thank you Yuta for your questions!
**Your connected workspace for wiki, docs & projects | Notion
My apologies; could you try it again? It should be available now.**
Of course. You can find the details here: Governance and Decentralization | Socious Whitepaper
I apologize for my initial misunderstanding. To clarify, even if people try to collude, they cannot game the system due to the mechanisms described here: FAQ | Socious Fund For this, there is no need to define what is collision.
We also have a system in place to impose penalties on users who attempt to cheat the system. FAQ | Socious Fund
For this, it’s decided through the decentralized dispute resolution mechanism.
Yes. Splitting $1,000 into 1,000 $1 donations incurs $0.42 per donation ($0.30 + 12% of $1), totaling $420 in fees. Only $580 reaches recipients. Donating $1,000 directly costs just 2% ($20.3), delivering $979.70. That’s a $400 difference, making splitting economically irrational. Paired with other anti-collusion tools, it’s a strong deterrent.
Thank you for sharing your concerns—I totally get why you’d feel uneasy about the $1.5M matching pool and how decisions are made. Let me break this down for you and address each part of your question clearly.
Decision-Making Power: Not Just a Small Group
You’re worried that the fate of the $1.5M might rest in the hands of just 10-20 small donors or a few high-scoring Socious users. I’m happy to reassure you that this isn’t the case! Socious currently has 15,000 users, so the decision-making process isn’t limited to a tiny group. With such a large and diverse community, the distribution reflects a wide range of contributions, not just those from a select few. In addition, users can get impact points for past or ongoing activities like volunteering, working for an impact organization, or donating, and have them recognized on Socious. All you need is a verifiable credential, and those impact points are credited to your account right away. Check out the details in the Socious Whitepaper if you want to dive deeper. This means that new users can have many impact points from day one.
In short, you don’t need to worry about a small clique controlling the $1.5M. With 15,000 users, the ability to earn impact points from a wide range of activities, Socious is built to be inclusive and rewarding. Your contributions—past, present, and future—can play a big role in this community.
If you’ve got more questions or want to explore how to jump in, feel free to ask.
Thank you very much
For now, regarding the last point, I think 15,000 users is great. However, the question is how many of them will donate and participate in decision-making, and I am worried that this may end up being around 10-20 people. I felt that this could be prevented by having a voting participation threshold, such as suspending distribution until 3,000 people, or 20% of 15,000, have voted.