CIP1694 Tokyo Mini-Workshop/Japan Community Feedback

As a result of holding a mini study session in Tokyo and collecting feedback on CIP 1694 from the Japanese community, we have come up with the following five comments, which we would like to share with you.:bowing_man:


Some of them may not be on point.

My English may be difficult to understand.

(1) Enumeration of risk assessment and response in CIP 1694

Why don’t you list the risk assessment and response in CIP1694 in an easy-to-understand manner?

:white_circle:︎dRep acquisition risk

:white_circle:︎Disinformation attack risk

Consider stating the need to develop sources of truth and educate the community.

:white_circle:︎Risk of the community delegating to just a well-known drep without deep thought

:white_circle:︎Risk of attacks that continue to submit useless proposals and exhaust the committee

:white_circle:︎Risk of a series of proposals by seemingly attractive but not feasible organizations

(2) Verify the appropriateness of having CIP 1694 finalized in July.

Is there enough content to educate the non-expert community?

Is there a rush to have it finalized in July?

Is there easy-to-understand cip1694 content in different languages?

Can we create an on-chain analysis document for the community to make a decision?

(3) Examination of factors that are outside the scope of CIP 1694 but could have a strong impact on the content adequacy determination of CIP 1694 and the need to “parallel” the discussion of these factors.

For example, we consider the following topics to be outside the scope of CIP 1694, but which may have a strong impact on the determination of the adequacy of its content.

・Contents of the Constitution

・Method of selecting initial members of the Constitutional Committee

・Various initial parameters

・Ex-ante and ex-post disclosures to be made by the dRep/each governance action / treasury fund distributor + the audit system for these disclosures

・Documentation of the decision-making process of the dRep/Constitutional Committee, etc.

・Financial reporting system for treasury distribution recipients

I am aware that these discussions are outside the scope of CIP 1694.

However, wouldn’t a “parallel” discussion of these contents lead to a more useful discussion?

I believe this is especially true of the Constitution.

Suppose we have a final workshop in July without any discussion of the content of the Constitution and CIP 1694 is finalized.

It would be inefficient if, as the content of the Constitution is subsequently discussed, there is a desire to change CIP 1694 and another costly final workshop of CIP 1694 is held again in September.

Particularly with regard to the Constitution, who can take the initiative on these and when can an early draft be presented?

(4) Thorough on-chain/off-chain analysis of the current situation as a basis for decision making and verification of measures for entities with strong voting power.

Because of very important changes, is there a thorough analysis of the current situation to increase predictability after implementation? Are there any countermeasures against powerful voting entities such as exchanges and cardano foundations?

・A comprehensive analysis of on-chain information such as ADA on exchanges, unstaked ADA, staked ADA that have not moved in x years, ADA frozen on FTX, ADA not participating in Catalyst, etc., to determine numerical information useful for discussions such as quorum, etc.

・Send a questionnaire to the top X entities with the largest holdings, such as cardano foundation, emurgo, iog, and binance, asking them about their voting policies, and publish the responses that are received.

・On-chain analysis of how realistic the risk is that IOG/Binance, etc. will become members of the Constitutional Committee and use ADA to protect their position, eventually fixing their position on the Constitutional Committee, etc.

・Will you implement a fund lock, as there was talk at one point of introducing a time lock to counter the exchanges?

(5)Verification of the need to be able to specify “any epoch” for the timing of enactment of governance actions.

Is there a need for a grace period with respect to certain key governance actions to avoid the following situations?

For example, suppose a governance action is submitted and the majority of the votes are YES.

Upon seeing the results, a member, feeling a sense of urgency, begins to discuss the need for a NO vote.

One after another, people want to change their vote to NO, but the governance action has already been ratified and enacted immediately.

東京でミニ勉強会を行ったり日本コミュニティからCIP 1694へのフィードバックを収集した結果、次の5つの意見が出ましたのでシェアさせていただきます。