“Remember folks, don’t forget to vote.” 
. I think you’re missing the point here Frog. What you’re reading here is direct. A open discussion about how to change our system for the better. All while you’re busy thinking about voting on who should represent us? I think you’re trying to play out of your league right now. All you can say is “armchair quarterbacking.” Thanks for the reminder why I personally wouldn’t vote for you in your special popularity contest. Good luck with all that bud. “Blue forty two… hut hut…get out of here!” 
In my calculation, for 100% saturation the pool’s ROI has a different shape of curve, which suggest delegating is always better a little bit than a full pledge, although the relative value of the cost and the margin from the delegated stakes will be less and less as the pledge increasing, which makes sense. But, yes, till a certain point it is very profitable for pools when they can have relative small pledge but able to attract delegators. Like 1PCTs and others. Theres is a point at df(x)/dx = 0 which is a turning point where it is not incentivise the entities to operate more than one pool. I had some suggestion in the past (called pledge weighted reward till that point) to cut that line with a 0 slope line (to eliminate the converge to an infinity profit as the pledge decreases see graph), might be I will create a CIP, but the pool ops would not like it as this pool profit craziness is very convenience to those who have already gained some high amount of stake but have relative small pledge. Sorry typing on a tablet.
Updated, added domain 0<x<=z0, and a0 slider to see that there is no issue with a0 in a sense of Sybil attack incentives, but the cost and margin in reward distribution.
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And also, lot of ppl do not understand that there is no any issue with a0 in the reward function (I think the whole reward func is brilliant but the reward distribution should need to be adjusted, though the reward function itself could be, could have some adjustment for eliminating the long tails i.e. lot of pools in equilibrium are operating with no delegated stake for some lower ROI e.g. 4.5% instead 6% as an example, but that is not rationale as those pools would die out for long term as operating pool has cost in addition to the smaller ROI, so easier just delegate than ooerating one but some very hard core ppl would do it anyway for the sake of the security of the network), and if it will be increased it would punish/penalise the small (pledged) pools, and not the small pledge pools are the issues (as everybody should be able to run a pool) but the different type Sybil attacks (i.e. one entity is incentivised with low pledge to have more than one pool running and gain power), that can come from some non-right incentives e.g. from reward distribution, you can see in the graph
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The SPOCRA vote is over dude. My commentary is only highlighting the obvious ineffectiveness of a nonexistent body and the time for engagement is but starting. SPOCRA is but one voice of many within the community and speaks only for SPOs who choose to engage SPOCRA as a vessel.
My personal views:
SPOs and delegators are the only centralized components of the ecosystem. I see maintaining a secure and healthy network/ecosystem for SPOs over the long term is going to come down to voting. Feedback loops and communication channels with large stakeholders can influence… seats on CF council can influence more - and collective vote delegation even more.
Whatever league it ain’t checkers, cupcake.
The beauty of the Cardano should be, that it must be a kind of human agnostic protocol, in a sense, that it would always converge to the equilibrium despite what you, me or others think would be the right path (like symbiosis), but to achieve it, the right incentives must be written in stone (by developers and scientists) at first,cos that is what drives any protocols even Bitcoin.
So, I meant whose voting? As SPO and delegators, has similar incentives but some of these incentive have opposite forces to each other. E.g. in general (small or large stakeholders) they have incentives to gain as high profit as possible, but it comes from one bucket, so if a delegator want higher profit then the SPO would have less and vice versa. Also, large stakeholders are more incentivised to protect their stake as they would loose much more than small ones. So, IMO it is not as easy as it looks. But, we will see what will come in the future, and I hope that Cardano would survive cos that means, we as humanity could win the final war against the power driven small elites.
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And I like this developer/scientist, SPOs, delegators approach as it would probably play out as a separation of powers i.e. check and balances to decrease the risk of centralisation of power, eliminate improper behaviour and reduce risks.
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I agree with this and the mission we share for Cardano.
Yeah it will take work and collaboration to realize a human agnostic equilibrium for Cardano. I think the CIP you mentioned potentially proposing is interesting.
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Yeah, but not sure whether it holds in every cases or not as this is very complex topic, with around twenty parameters involved and we humans cannot really see through that complexity (that is why I am really skeptic with firm statements from anybody e.g. some other protocols too, without backed up some real and proper data, as there is no such genius in the world that could see through those complexities even if she/he would have the highest IQ in the world, because usually, I would say always, it is just a puzzle from the bigger context what that person can understand at that abstraction level based on his/her capabilities), that is why we use simple models to get our head around complexities.
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I am loving this conversation of mathematical model being use to incentivised a specific outcome of human behavior. It’s another reason I love the Cardano community. The CSPA (Cardano Single Pool Alliance) is not about censorship of large pools vs small pools. It’s not a censorship of multi-pool ownership by a single entity. CSPA goal is not even to be a bureaucratic government for SPOs. CSPA primary goal is to promote True Decentralization in which at least 51% of the network is decentralized by single pools…with each having a stake close enough to Saturation. How we get there is a human experiment that employees the aid mathematical variable and formula. A great reward formula alone wouldn’t solve our current problem. While mathematical is predictable, the human ingenuity to game a mathematical system is far more intelligent. CSPA believes that True Decentralization is strongest in a 1:1 ratio of a pool owner to a stake pool. It’s common sense. Let’s work together to achieve this goal. It’s best for the Cardano resilience and longevity.
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“Tshirts for sale, get your Tshirts. Hey you! Did you get a Tshirt yet?”
You might not be in the checkers league Frogman 
, but you sure as hell ain’t playing chess. 
I think it’s more complex, as Cardano as a vision should declare and/or define the values it represents and wrote it in a stone like a constitution.
As every ppl could have different values in different degree based on their believes/opinions (these called personal truths), which has nothing to do anything /w objective/rational truths that Cardano should represent. That’s why it’s a bit more complex.
I also, mentioned a lot of times that:
- anybody can have as many pools as much money they have to full pledge (there are incentives to achieve it automatically for long term),
- The rest, only can have one and only one pool (but, I cannot see forces/incentives to achieve it).
But, and there are a lot of ppl for or against these above statements, but those are simply come from their believes/opinions (i.e. personal truths) (so do mine too? very likely), as almost everybody are driven by some different degree of moral and/or financial incentives (it’s a spectrum as always).
But, the rationale of those 2 points is to eliminate/prevent different type of Sybil attacks (meaning secure the system), and it means that if these are not forced by incentives, then the protocol cannot be sustainable for long term (i.e. never will reach equilibrium).
Yeah, it’s very complex and ofc, this is just one aspect of a much more complex problem.
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I agree. It’s indeed a complex problem. But I also believe it’s a problem that can be mitigated even if we (IOHK, CF, and the Cardano community at large) can not find a perfect solution.
The FROG merchandise is an end-to-end service provided by a solid community member. Neither my idea or my effort. No sense in knocking a great service provided to operators by a great community member.
T-Shirts lol. Next time check out FROG meta before making a fool of yourself. Keep practicing, stop clowning, and go build something useful for the ecosystem.