PCP 005_committeeMinSize_Yuta

Governance Parameter Change Proposals (PCP)
1

Title

Proposal to Reduce the Minimum Constitutional Committee Size from 7 to 5

Description

This proposal seeks to modify the governance parameter committeeMinSize, which defines the minimum number of Constitutional Committee members, from 7 to 5.

The objective is to enhance the efficiency and responsiveness of the Constitutional Committee (CC) while maintaining decentralization, quorum stability, and compliance with the Cardano Constitution.
The proposed new value remains within the permitted constitutional range defined in the Guardrails Appendix (3 ≤ committeeMinSize ≤ 10).

This proposal is neutral with respect to any specific individuals or institutions and focuses solely on parameter-level governance efficiency.

4 Likes
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Great! Thanks for the initiative @YUTA_Oishi! What’s the next step? Is this a process that will be handled mainly by the parameter committee?

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This is a well-considered proposal. Reducing the minimum size from 7 to 5 seems like a reasonable adjustment to improve responsiveness without compromising decentralization or stability. I support this change.

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i would say we reduce it to 3 , because we dont want to be held hostage by sudden situations like at present , and thats the mininum we are allowed to choose , we can elect 5 people or 7 people , or 9 or any number , and even if the term ends of elected members it is easier to find 3 people than 5 people who everyone can agree on in emergenc situations. we can elect 5 or 7 again but chaing the para to 3 so that unless every committee members leaves we can still run the governance

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The current value of 7 is totally fine imo. What we need is more individual CC members. So that we are more resilient against memers resigning like right now.

I would like to see at least 10 CC members.

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Thank you @YUTA_Oishi for submitting this PCP.

Please find below the Parameter Committee’s response following our meeting on 4 December 2025.

Parameter Committee Response: PCP-005 (Reduction of committeeMinSize to 5)

Date: December 5, 2025

Subject: Recommendation regarding the proposal to reduce committeeMinSize from 7 to 5.

Reference: PCP 005 _committeeMinSize_Yuta

Executive Summary

The Parameter Committee has reviewed the proposal to reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5. Following deliberation during the tri-weekly meeting on December 4, 2025, the Committee recommends approving this reduction.

However, the Committee advises that this change should follow the standard governance timeline. While the current operational environment is fragile, the immediate deadlock is being resolved via the upcoming “Update Committee” action. Therefore, this parameter change should be treated as a strategic resilience upgrade rather than an emergency patch, respecting the Constitutional Guardrails regarding notice periods for governance-critical parameters.

1. Current Operational Context

The Committee acknowledges the current friction in the governance system and the necessity for this change to ensure future liveness.

  • Current Status: The retirement of a Constitutional Committee (CC) member on November 25, 2025, dropped the active committee size to 6. With committeeMinSize currently set at 7, the ledger cannot currently ratify governance actions requiring CC approval. This includes protocol parameter changes as well as hard forks and treasury withdrawals.
  • Immediate Resolution: The Committee notes that Intersect is executing a snap election, with an on-chain “Update Committee” action expected on December 8. If approved by the DReps and SPOs, this will restore the active size to 7, resolving the immediate ratification blockage.
  • Strategic Necessity: While the election solves the immediate issue, it leaves the system in a fragile state where Active Members equals Minimum Required. Assuming that the desired committee size is 7, then reducing the minimum size to 5 is important to create an operational buffer for the future, preventing a single resignation from causing another deadlock.

2. Guardrail Analysis and Timeline

The Committee reviewed the proposal against the Constitutional Guardrails to ensure validity.

A. Numerical Compliance (CMS-01, CMS-02, CMS-03)

The proposed value of 5 is compliant with the established Guardrails for the Constitutional Committee size:

  • CMS-01: The value must not be negative.
  • CMS-02: The value must not be lower than 3.
  • CMS-03: The value must not exceed 10.
  • Conclusion: The proposal sits safely within the permitted range of 3 to 10.

B. Timeline and PARAM-06a

Guardrail PARAM-06a states that at least 3 months should normally pass between the publication of an off-chain proposal to change a governance-critical parameter and the submission of the corresponding on-chain governance action.

  • Recommendation: The Committee does not recommend waiving this 3-month waiting period.
  • Rationale: Since the immediate functional deadlock is being resolved by the December 8 election (restoring the committee to 7 members), the urgency to reduce the parameter immediately is mitigated. Adhering to the 3-month period ensures the community has adequate time to debate this reduction without the pressure of an active crisis.

3. Historical Context & Rationale for Reduction

Why was it set to 7?

The parameter was historically set to 7 to match the original number of Genesis keys and ensure a balance of power during the interim period. The intent was to ensure that community-elected members (originally planned as 4) could outnumber the automatically installed Founding Entities (3).

Why reduce it to 5?

  • Operational Resilience: The Committee agrees that a reduction to 5 creates a necessary safety margin for a constitutional committee of size 7. It allows the CC to function even if two members resign (assuming a full committee of 7), preventing the governance paralysis currently being experienced.
  • Security vs. Efficiency: The Committee concluded that reducing the minimum size to 5 would not be harmful or significantly increase attack vectors. However, reducing it further (e.g., to the minimum of 3 permitted by CMS-03) was strongly opposed due to the increased impact of individual decisions on governance.
  • Odd numbers preferred: The Committee considers it good practice to have a constitutional committee that has an odd number of members.

To avoid similar issues in future, the Committee does not recommend installing a constitutional committee of size 5.

The Committee considered the issue of institutional versus group members of the constitutional committee, but did not consider that this made a material difference to the minimum committee size.

4. Final Recommendation

The Parameter Committee recommends approval of the proposal to reduce committeeMinSize to 5, to be enacted following the standard notice period for governance-critical parameters.

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Thank you very much Nicolas, I agree that it would be safer to submit it after February 12th, since the Constitution requires a minimum of three months. :folded_hands:

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Thank you Martin, I don’t object to more CC members per se :folded_hands: but it is possible to change the minimum number of CC members to 5, but have a CC of 10 or more.

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Thank you. I also don’t have a strong objection to ultimately reducing it to 3. The Parameter Committee is not recommending a change to 3, and considering the existence of DRep, which has a conservative stance, I think it would be better to first reduce it to 5 and then propose reducing it to 3.:folded_hands:

1 Like
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The next step was to gather input from the parameters committee, which we have received. :folded_hands:
The next step from here requires three months of off-chain consultations, so we will continue discussions until February 12th.:folded_hands:

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I have drafted a governance action to “Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5.” Please let me know if you have any concerns.

https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreigmd7xasljkmisbal5pu2xcqolr2fkre4jnlllgqrof4wctadxa7m

:small_blue_diamond: Reduce minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5

:small_blue_diamond: Abstract

Reduce the minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5 in order to improve operational resilience while maintaining constitutional safeguards.

:small_blue_diamond: Motivation

The Constitutional Committee is designed to operate with seven members. However, maintaining a minimum size of seven creates operational fragility, as a single resignation or temporary unavailability can prevent the Committee from functioning.

Reducing the minimum size to five provides an operational buffer, allowing the Committee to continue operating as intended and reducing the risk of governance inoperability.

:small_blue_diamond: Rationale

Based on the analysis conducted by the Intersect Parameter Committee, reducing the minimum Constitutional Committee size (committeeMinSize) from 7 to 5 is considered both useful and safe for the following reasons.

1. Operational resilience
A minimum size of five provides an appropriate safety margin for a committee designed to have seven members. This allows the Constitutional Committee to remain operational even if up to two members are unavailable, thereby reducing the risk that the Committee becomes unable to act within required governance timelines.

2. Security and efficiency balance
Reducing the minimum size to five does not materially increase security risks or attack vectors. Further reductions (for example, to the minimum of three permitted under CMS-03) were not supported, as they would significantly increase the influence of individual members on constitutional decisions and weaken collective judgment.

3. Decision clarity
Maintaining an odd-numbered committee is considered good practice, as it reduces the likelihood of tied outcomes and supports clear, timely, and auditable decision-making.

:small_blue_diamond: Governance Action Standards and Guardrail Compliance

This governance action follows the standardized and legible format required for on-chain governance actions.
An immutable off-chain document providing the final version of this proposal, including its title, abstract, justification, and supporting materials, is hosted at a publicly accessible URL, and the hash of that document is referenced on-chain. The content of the on-chain governance action is identical to the final off-chain version.

The proposed value of five complies with the Guardrails governing Constitutional Committee size:

  • CMS-01: The value is not negative.
  • CMS-02: The value is not lower than three.
  • CMS-03: The value does not exceed ten.

In accordance with Guardrail PARAM-06a, at least 90 days have passed between the publication of the off-chain proposal to change a parameter that is critical to the governance system and the submission of the corresponding on-chain governance action, and therefore this requirement is satisfied.

As a Parameter Update governance action, this proposal has undergone appropriate technical review and scrutiny through the Intersect Parameter Committee process and does not endanger the security, functionality, performance, or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain.

:small_blue_diamond: Reversion

This change is unlikely to require reversion, is reversible if needed, and would not have a negative impact on the network if reverted.

:small_blue_diamond: Reference

PCP 005_committeeMinSize_Yuta
https://forum.cardano.org/t/pcp-005-committeeminsize-yuta/151156

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This governance action has been submitted to the preview testnet.

https://preview.cardanoscan.io/govAction/gov_action1ey55knzkx9hc30zs9rf0xda88ultwwqqlzqc36fs5tm2ltgszw6qqd3eckx?tab=meta

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Hey @YUTA_Oishi,

Here is my concern regarding reducing committeeMinSize. First is the separation of powers; second is the ability for any CC member to make an “absolute veto” on a governance action.

Separation of Powers: A judiciary that is not independent from the executive branch is a major structural problem. Having a CC that still works on just 5 keys concentrates power and increases the risk of them being influenced in their decision-making. If we reduce from 7 to 5 keys, it simply becomes “cheaper” for the concentration of power on-chain to push the CC around.

This is particularly true as ADA owners do not currently directly elect CC members. The way we practice it today is that DReps elect the CC, whose job is to oversee the proposals they approve. That already reduces the democratic separation of powers. We have the “Vote of No Confidence” and “Update Committee” actions that serve as a balance on the CC. Reducing to 5 keys will, in my opinion, add another layer of risk.

“Absolute Veto”: As we have already seen demonstrated, the CC has tried to use the “absolute veto” to push the ledger into a state where negotiations between DReps and the CC were forced to begin to reach a compromise.

Unfortunately, this negotiation was interrupted by the arrangement of the fastest CC election ever, as “someone” meant the “cost” of not having a working CC body was bigger than actually reaching an agreement regarding CC compensation without valuing the democratic debate and reaching a compromise in that debate.

What if this was about a Hardfork or a parameter change where one CC member identifies a critical risk or something very wrong?
What if this was a treasury withdraw?
Well, then we no longer have a mechanism to make DReps “think twice.”

Until we get ADA owners to directly elect CC members and have a very clear technical solution for DReps and SPOs to communicate with their delegators, reducing CC credentials on-chain from 7 to 5 will degrade the democratic values that Cardano already has a struggle to maintain.
Currently, if we remove ‘Always Abstain’ voting power from the circulating supply, there is only 16% active participation from ADA owners. Reducing CC keys will only exponential reduce CC “power” in the Cardano ecosystem.

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Hi KenErik, thanks for your feedback. This may already be obvious to you, and I apologize if it is, but this only lowers the “minimum number of CCs,” not the actual number of CCs. :folded_hands:

Concern 1: This can be mitigated by continuing to appoint seven CCs.

Concern 2: This change is specifically intended to address this issue. In other words, if this change were implemented, even if two of the seven CCs tried to negotiate with the DRep by threatening to resign, it would be tolerable because the reduction of two CCs would be tolerable. Just to be clear, this does not mean that the CAC did this.

This does not mean that the CC keys are reduced from seven to five, but only that the minimum number of keys is reduced from seven to five. I may have misunderstood your point; please correct me if this is the case. :folded_hands:

1 Like
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This governance action has been submitted to the preview testnet. https://preview.cardanoscan.io/govAction/gov_action1ey55knzkx9hc30zs9rf0xda88ultwwqqlzqc36fs5tm2ltgszw6qqd3eckx?tab=meta

2 Likes
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As in my X post reply.
I will post my reply here as well. So those who do not follow me can read.
My personal take on this: With the current concentration of DRep / SPO voting power, along with low ADA owner participation in governance, reducing CommitteeMinSize to 5 will concentrate critical decision making even more. It’s also in conflict with traditional democratic values in regards to the separation of powers.

CommitteeMinSize is a ledger feature, not a bug. It represents part of the separation of powers between DReps/SPOs and ADA owners. In the worst case, only 3 members would be needed to collude if only 5 members are active. This is due to how the ledger calculates votingCommitteeThreshold.

The whole point of CommitteeMinSize is to prevent and halt a “worst case scenario” automatically. I’m aware that you intend to maintain 7 CC members, but that is not a good failsafe.

1 Like
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Thank you for preparing this Governance Action! I agree with your reasoning and will support the change of the MINIMUM number of CC members to 5 while working to maintain a regular number of 7.