Proposed CIP: Graduated Ratification Thresholds — End ‘Uncast = No’ for Non-Constitutional Votes

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Proposed CIP: Graduated Ratification Thresholds — End ‘Uncast = No’ for Non-Constitutional Votes

Tags: cip, governance, ratification, participation, voting, thresholds, drep, chang

Summary

This proposal introduces graduated ratification thresholds for Cardano governance actions.
It aims to preserve network safety for critical protocol changes while restoring democratic responsiveness for routine and advisory decisions.
Only constitutional or protocol-critical votes would continue to count uncast stake as opposition (“not voting = no”); all other categories would be decided by the majority of votes cast.

Motivation

Cardano’s current governance framework, defined in CIP-1694 and related specifications, applies the same ratification rule to every governance action.
The threshold is measured against the total active voting power, effectively treating all uncast stake as implicit opposition.
While this design maximises safety, it also creates systemic risks to long-term governability:

  • Chronic low participation: Many votes attract low turnout. Even proposals supported by a 3 : 1 Yes : No ratio can fail purely from inactivity.
  • Unknowable abstention motives: Non-voting stake may represent apathy, lack of awareness, or technical barriers — not true opposition.
  • Participation penalty: Supporters must act while opponents can block progress simply by staying silent.
  • Governance black hole: When abstention and opposition are indistinguishable, rational “No” voters disengage (silence already counts as No), and discouraged “Yes” voters give up. Over time, participation collapses and governance grinds to a halt.

If sustained, this feedback loop risks making Cardano ungovernable: the system rewards inaction, punishes engagement, and fails to evolve even when consensus exists.

This CIP treats participation not as a social issue but as a governance-sustainability risk.
By limiting “uncast = no” semantics to constitution-level actions, Cardano can preserve its conservative safeguards while restoring meaningful incentives to vote.

Specification

1. Governance-action categories

Category Example Actions Counting Rule
A – Constitutional / Protocol-Critical Hard-fork initiations, monetary policy, governance-framework amendments ≥ 67 % of total active voting power (uncast = No)
B – Policy / Treasury Treasury disbursements, parameter updates, incentive structures ≥ 66 % of votes cast with ≥ 40 % participation quorum (uncast = Neutral)
C – Advisory / Signalling Non-binding polls, feedback measures Simple majority of votes cast (uncast = Neutral)

2. Counting logic

  • For B and C: only Yes + No votes determine outcome; uncast stake is excluded.
  • For A: uncast stake continues to count as opposition.
  • A new field decision_category SHALL be added to the on-chain governance action record.
  • Ratification logic branches according to this category.

Rationale

This adjustment prevents systemic ossification without weakening constitutional safety.
It aligns ratification strength with decision criticality:

  • High-risk protocol changes still require overwhelming, explicit consent.
  • Routine or reversible policy actions can proceed with demonstrated active support.
  • Advisory votes can operate flexibly to gauge sentiment.

The result is a system that is both secure and governable:
engagement becomes meaningful, opposition must be explicit, and Cardano’s governance regains momentum while remaining protected against capture.

References

Feedback from DReps, SPOs, Intersect members, and governance contributors is welcome before formal CIP submission.

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Thanks for viewing this post. My motivation is to make Cardano a functioning democracy. I don’t think that dreps who don’t vote explicitly intend to vote ‘No’. I see this as a debilitating flaw in the smooth flow of decisionmaking on Cardano, and ultimately it could cause governance to become very difficult.

Treating “not voting” as “no” violates core democratic principles:

  1. Freedom of non-participation: Citizens have the right to not participate without having that inaction converted into opposition.
  2. Active consent model: Legitimate ratification requires affirmative support — not presumed rejection.

It also leads to paradoxes:

  • A measure can fail even if 100% of those who voted supported it, simply because others didn’t engage.
  • It creates a status quo bias that punishes low turnout and discourages participation (since abstaining and opposing yield the same effect).
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My concern is that a small group of bad actors could collude to raise a treasury withdrawal governance action, not publicize it, and have it passed with a low participation rate. IMO 40% participation is a little low for a treasury withdrawal.
In the recent GovTool GA, participation was ~74%, Yes ~56%, No ~14%, No Confidence ~3%, not voted ~26%, and it failed to achieve 67% Yes.
The not voted stake does not contribute to the Yes vote but it does contribute to the total active stake, which in effect means it counts as No, although it is separate.
Under this proposal, the total stake would have been reduced by the stake not voted, and the withdrawal would have passed with 76% Yes, 19% No, and 5% No Confidence.
I got these numbers by checking the GA in AdaStat and plugging the numbers into a spreadsheet.

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This proposal feels like a natural evolution for Cardano governance, balancing security with practicality.
By making “uncast = no” apply only to constitutional-level actions, we preserve the network’s safety while finally giving real weight to participation.

It’s a shift from defensive governance to responsive governance, and I believe it could help re-energize both DReps and the wider community to engage meaningfully.

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