The Community Wants to Know: Episode 3 [Transcript]

Guest: WADA Drep / Nana Safo (13.81M ADA Voting Power)

Drep Id: drep1y2jnqfamg4tq5aepxhggzhqg7pq5gunph4wypkyh9q3qt2cru5m2j

Host: Our guest on the Hot Seat today is Nana Safo, the lead for the WADA DRep committee. Welcome to the stage. Nana registered on October 2, 2024, as one of the pioneer DReps of the Voltaire era. Today, he represents 13.81M ADA with 95 delegators. His engagement is high: 93% participation, 80 votes cast, and a rationale rate of 98.8%. How are you feeling today, Nana?

Nana: Hi, I’m doing well. It’s been a lot of work and many meetings, but I’m glad to be here.

Host: Good to hear. Your motivation states you want to amplify underrepresented voices and increase participation in Africa. Is it just you, or a group?

Nana: WADA DRep is a committee. There are individuals in the background assessing proposals, but I am the public face. The rest currently choose to remain anonymous to avoid outside influence during deliberations. We keep an internal tracker for every governance action, and while those documents are currently behind closed doors, we plan to expose them to the community in the future.

Host: You have great metrics, but how do you engage your 95 delegators?

Nana: This is the million-dollar question. We tried using polling tools like WithTools and Tempo.vote, but we didn’t get much response. The reality is that people delegate because they don’t have the time to do the research themselves. Many are likely delegating just to keep their staking rewards active—the “penalty” for not participating is a major factor. Because we don’t always know who our delegators are, we plan to start “Governance Sessions” on X to discuss actions with the wider community.

Host: Let’s talk about the Treasury. You used the same rationale for 39 different withdrawals last year. How can a ₳99k project and a ₳96M withdrawal for IOG have the same rationale?

Nana: We used a generic rationale because we were involved in the budget process from the beginning. We had firsthand knowledge of these projects through Intersect’s drafting stages. We didn’t feel the need to submit 39 individual rationales when we had already performed prior assessments. While the impact of a 96M project and a 99k project varies, we believe both bring value that the ecosystem needs. Going forward, we will consider integrating more specific individual rationales for clarity.

Host: You voted “Yes” on several Info Actions that bring your total supported spending to over ₳400M, yet you claim to be “conservative” with a ₳280M limit. How do you reconcile this?

Nana: We differentiate between Info Actions and Treasury Withdrawals. We might support an Info Action because the idea is good, but when it comes to the actual Withdrawal, we are much stricter to stay within our budget. For 2025, our actual withdrawals were around ₳277M, which is below our limit.

Host: But you didn’t vote on the ₳70M Pentad withdrawal. Why?

Nana: We actually missed that deadline. The committee was busy organizing the CATS 2026 event. We thought we had more time, but the threshold was met before we could cast our vote. It escaped us. We hope to have a better multitasking approach in the future.

Host: Do you check the impact of the money you’ve already approved? Projects like Catalyst have been put on hold, and some are behind schedule.

Nana: We check “in a while” via the Treasury Tracker. It is unfortunate that some projects are dragging their feet. In our rationales, we stated that we are trusting Intersect to act as the administrator and keep a close eye on these projects to ensure they deliver milestones before funds are released. Regarding Catalyst, the pause of Funds 15 and 16 is negative news for proposers, but a “positive” for the Treasury because unspent funds are returned.

Host: You voted NO on CC compensation and NO on adding a buffer member (Christina) to prevent a governance shutdown. Why block the safety of the system?

Nana: We voted No on compensation because we believe in “Governance Equity.” We don’t think one body (the CC) should be paid in isolation while DReps and SPOs—who do equally vital work—are not. We want a unified, fair payment system for everyone. As for the 8th CC member, we respected the candidate, but we wanted a more deliberate process rather than just adding a buffer.

Here is the polished, professional, and raw version of the Episode 3 Audit (Part 2). I have corrected the spelling, grammar, and sentence structure while preserving the authentic flow of the conversation and the “Inquisitor” vs. “DRep” dynamic.

Host: Welcome back. We were discussing the Constitutional Committee (CC). Why did you vote in a seemingly contradictory way—denying CC compensation while also voting against a “buffer” member for the community?

Nana: We stand by our position. The constitution states that governance parties may be compensated. However, we believe that if we do this as an ecosystem, we need proper mechanisms that recognize all parties—DReps, SPOs, and the CC. One party shouldn’t enjoy benefits while others work for nothing. We believe that over time, discussions about compensating DReps have faced pushback. We didn’t want to support a single party ahead of the rest, as that makes people disengaged or furious with the process. While the CC’s work is vital, so is the work of DReps. We want to avoid a situation where we incentivize one and ignore the others.

Host: But the CC members are elected by the people to uphold the constitution, whereas DReps and SPOs are voluntary roles. SPOs already have an incentive via minting blocks. DReps chose to stand up. Doesn’t paying voluntary roles undermine the spirit of volunteering, compared to an elected role with a mandate?

Nana: It’s a matter of perspective. People willingly decide to act as DReps, but they are doing the work that delegators don’t have the time or capacity to do. Delegating is essentially voting an individual in to act on your behalf. We need to look beyond the word “willingly” and look at what it actually takes to be an effective DRep. Many register and then go silent because the work—finding delegators, assessing actions, writing rationales—is actual work that needs appreciation. We believe in building a structured mechanism where all actors are recognized. If a mechanism is introduced that rewards everyone fairly, we wouldn’t hesitate to support it.

Host: Regarding Christina (the proposed 8th CC member), you acknowledged she is high-quality, yet you voted NO on adding her as a buffer to prevent governance shutdowns. Why?

Nana: We truly appreciate Christina’s contributions. We actually voted for her during the initial CC election. However, our “No” vote on the governance action was because we supported the original Intersect CC election process and believed in those results. We also had internal concerns: if you have eight members, what happens in the event of a tie vote? We didn’t have enough answers on how a tie-breaker would work, so we didn’t feel comfortable voting “Yes” on an even-numbered committee size.

Host: Let’s talk about the Constitution. You voted NO on 2.0 because the process lacked traction, ABSTAINED on 2.3, and finally voted YES on 2.4. My question is about representation. The first constitution in Nairobi had thousands of participants. Constitution 2.4 seemingly only had 200–250 active participants, mostly DReps. How does a constitution shaped by 200 people uphold the background of millions of ADA holders compared to the thousands who participated originally?

Nana: It is a very interesting question. We were very reserved about this amendment process. While we might not have thousands of participants like we did for the Constitutional Convention, we live in a digital world where engagement is often very difficult and discouragingly low. However, once you get a good “sample size” with a variety of expertise, you can proceed. We saw that the author (Juuta) took our feedback into account for version 2.4.

We also recommended setting up a “Constitutional Amendment Working Group” within the Civic Committee to draft a proper, permanent process for future amendments. We didn’t want to block 2.4 because the changes were useful—for instance, removing the “Info Budget” to lessen the burden on the CC and DReps. We believe this is a step forward in creating a template that anyone with 100k ADA can eventually follow to propose changes in a structured way.

Host: I have to cut you here as we’ve reached our one-hour limit. You believe the current constitution has a sufficient sample size to move forward while the process is refined for the future.

And my friends, that concludes our deep dive into the ledger and the rationales. We have brought the data to the light and put the tough questions on the table. Not for the sake of the person, but for the sake of the protocol.

The evidence is now in your hands. As a delegator, you are the final judge. You have the power. You have the ADA. And now you have the facts. Use them. I am your host. See you at the next episode of The Community Wants to Know with a new guest on the Hot Seat.

Nana: Thank you for having me. Let’s build Cardano together.

X space link - https://x.com/silversoul8668/status/2028852301981770220?s=20 (part 1 )
https://x.com/silversoul8668/status/2029192763980562836?s=20 (part 2 )
Episode 2 link - The Community Wants to Know: Episode 2 [Transcript]

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Episode 3 Summary: WADA DRep Under the Micro-Lens

In Episode 3 of “The Community Wants to Know,” we sat down with Nana Safo, lead of the WADA DRep Committee. WADA is one of the pioneer DReps of the Voltaire era, currently representing 13.81M ADA with a high engagement rate of 98.8%.

However, beneath the high engagement metrics, our audit revealed significant tensions regarding fiscal discipline, committee transparency, and the prioritization of “DRep Equity” over system stability.

Key Audit Findings

1. The “Black Box” Committee & Passive Mandate

WADA operates as a committee rather than a single individual. However, the committee members remain anonymous, and their internal deliberation trackers are kept behind closed doors.

  • The Tension: While WADA’s mission is “robust governance,” the decision-making process for ₳403M in supported actions remains opaque.
  • The Admission: Nana acknowledged that many delegators likely choose WADA simply to avoid the staking reward “penalty,” creating a passive mandate that requires even higher levels of public transparency—which is currently missing.

2. Fiscal Discipline vs. Technical Oversight

A major point of the audit was the discrepancy between WADA’s “Conservative” fiscal stance and their actual voting record.

  • The ₳403M Support: WADA has voted “Yes” on various Info Actions and Treasury Withdrawals totaling over ₳403M.
  • The “Missed” Vote: WADA claimed to stay under their ₳280M limit for 2025. However, it was revealed that they didn’t vote “No” to the ₳70M Pentad withdrawal out of discipline—they simply missed the deadline because the committee was busy organizing an event.
  • Trust-Based Oversight: WADA admitted they “trust Intersect” to handle project oversight, stating they check the impact of funded projects only “in a while.”

3. CC Compensation: The “Hostage” Strategy?

One of the most controversial segments involved WADA’s “No” vote on Constitutional Committee (CC) compensation.

  • Governance Equity: WADA argued that the CC should not be paid until a unified framework is created to pay DReps and SPOs as well.
  • The Impact: By blocking CC pay to leverage a conversation about their own future pay, WADA contributed to the governance gridlock that led to CC resignations and an emergency election cycle.

4. Constitution 2.4: Quality over Quantity

We challenged WADA on supporting Constitution 2.4, which was shaped by a sample size of roughly 200-250 participants (mostly DReps), compared to the thousands who participated in the original Nairobi convention.

  • WADA’s Defense: They argued that in a digital ecosystem, a “quality sample size” of experts is sufficient to move the protocol forward, even if mass participation has dwindled.
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While reading these, make sure to listen in on the recorded spaces itself as summaries, especially as framed by Gintama, can be a negative-leading for no reason.

We had a great convo and I implore everyone to listen in.

Just to correct your summary where you said:

The “Missed” Vote: WADA claimed to stay under their ₳280M limit for 2025. However, it was revealed that they didn’t vote “No” to the ₳70M Pentad withdrawal out of discipline—they simply missed the deadline because the committee was busy organizing an event.”

The issue was that like with any proposal, there is a deadline date at which a proposal has to pass by…

But if it reaches the threshold before then, you miss the
”deadline” the Pentad proposal passed very quickly. There will be many examples in future where Dreps will be recorded as not voting on a proposal, but the reality is that the vote passed super quick. Individual Dreps will be able to vote quicker than those that are committees and have to organise meetings of multiple people to discuss votes.

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This is absolutely wrongheaded.

Your question was about if delegators in general were delegating to DReps to have access to their staking rewards. Wada DRep was not singled out here and hence your summary is flawed. As Wada DRep, we believe that every single person who has delegated to us has a strong belief in our objectives and philosophy as an organization, and that is something we have and keep on upholding throughout this governance journey.

While you are trying to get people to follow this course, I implore you to produce genuine summaries or better still the actual entire transcript of the conversation instead.

Summaries like what you have done here are really negative-skewed and I really don’t see how if it continues like this, the course would yield any positive impact except for delegators beginning to move their delegations to auto-abstain or no confidence out of misinformation if they’re unable to listen to the actual conversation.

While we may have engaged with lots of budget proposals that could total the ₳403 million, we have approved only ₳277 million spending in actuality.

As elaborated in the conversation, a lot of these other projects are info actions we believed in the ideology and impact it could yield for the ecosystem. The fact that an info action is being submitted and assessed today doesn’t necessarily mean that a treasury withdrawal will follow right on.

In our rationale to most of these other projects, we advised that they consider submitting treasury withdrawal actions in subsequent budget windows even though we do support their info-actions and many are those who adhered.

This means that as a DRep, we have played our cards safe and stayed fiscally disciplined.