"Trusted hardware and blockchain alchemy" | MIT Bitcoin Club


#1

Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gx4B82lxU3c


Accurate description of how airdropped coins work
#2

Thanks so much for your effort … i find this really interesting


#3

Actually the multi sig solution is amazing!
nice solution for a big problem for this feature…


#4

That part raised more questions in my head than answers… questions like:

  1. How long do you listen for response? What if the guy is locked up somewhere? Theoretically, two guys could just lock him up and steal his bitcoin.

  2. What is used as a response? Any chance someone other than actual user could broadcast his response?


#5

Indeed you´re right! yet

It would be his fault to partner with such individuals…

For that i guess, we would need some technical material or white paper from the company to know more about how they think to do it to be able to give you an answer


#6

Indeed while watching I thought exactly the same. Stealing a couple of bucks could be prevented by such a variable multisig solution. But when it’s about a bunch of bitcoins, “good” old Mafia methods would circumvent all this “smartness”.

On point 2 I think there is not to worry about. Bob’s response will be something generated with his private multisig key. No-one else can generate it an no-one else than Alice and Charlie can verify his correctness.


#7

Actual actual reality: nobody cares about his secrets.

Whatever informational-security arguments you make - it always can be counter-argued by “But what’s if they just beat him up until he says them the password?” :slight_smile: Doesn’t mean informational-security arguments should not be made, imo :smiley:


#8

Против лома нет приёма :slight_smile:

I agree this would apply to my second point but the guy could just get in a car accident and lie in a hospital for 10 days while his money gets siphoned out…

What if he travels to a remote location with no internet?


#9

Fully agree. I found it just nit the best place and moment for this (2/3)/3 multisig example, because he exactly told that these rich A, B and C are not so good friends and already fear that two of them would steal from the third one.
The offered solution is not an entire solution as it soubds like. It only solves the IT part. Which is good but not a complete solution.


#10

The mafia methods work against all cryptographic security guarantees that rely on a bunch of strings…

If you had your money in the bank, at least you have some distance btw yourself and that money…


#11

I was thinking what is it about multisig that gives them so much utility that would overcome their desire just to hold their pks in a vault in Switzerland? Especially if they don’t really trust each other…


#12

What I wonder is why nobody is talking about other factors and rulesets. For example why not implement something giving access to 2/3 of funds when 1/3 is not responding anymore.
An “unexpected” car accident happens less often, when nobody else can benefit from. And as long as you don’t know if you’re part of 1 or 2/3 in this game it would be very relaxing to have implemented something not related to any timeout.


#13

I think the whole set up was not Nash stable, meaning participants are encouraged to sabotage each other because there is a reward at the end…

Surprised no one thought of that when they offered their solution to Richie and his friends.

Your proposal would have taken care of this imbalance.


#14

Looks like this video shows only parts of the whole project.
Several guys with academic background
http://www.initc3.org/people.html

Face 6 challenges
http://www.initc3.org/projects.html

And the whole project has quite a lot of known aims and properties
http://www.initc3.org/about.html

The question is: friend/partner or enemy/adversary?


#15

You’re money in the bank ? Really …


#16

Actually, LEDGER has solution for Mafia methods (another secret Ledger in the Ledger), for cases when someone is being threatened or abducted.

However, I am pretty better in a theory than in any practical aspect, and the LEDGER’s warning:
“Do not activate this option if you are not absolutely sure to understand it.”
is not being beneficial for my confidence. I will stick with the basic settings.


#17

Awesome disclaimer! :slight_smile:

From what I understand, this feature just allows a user to have two wallets in the same Ledger - one “main” wallet and one “secret” wallet. Both wallets are opened with the same mnemonic words, but with different PIN-codes. So if someone puts a pistol to your head and asks you to open it - you open only the “main” wallet, and the “secret” wallet stays.

Pretty neat feature. Andreas was talking about it on one of Joe Rogan podcasts, and was saying that it’s similar to having a little cash in your pocket, and a big cash-stack in your sock, so when you get mugged - they only take the pocket-money. To which Joe responded logically - “oooh, but now you have told it to everyone and now everyone knows you also have money in your sock, so good luck with that” :slight_smile:

So yeah, the main concern about this feature is: in the “best” worst case, you will be forced to give up both wallets, but in the worst worst case - someone who knows nothing about this feature may be tortured with a request to give up “the second one” :frowning_face:


#18

"So yeah, the main concern about this feature is: in the “best” worst case, you will be forced to give up both wallets, but in the worst worst case - someone who knows nothing about this feature may be tortured with a request to give up “the second one” "

Yes, because the LEDGER’s public explanation of this feature the posibility of torture to get the second PIN has also come into my mind, wodering what the ground had been for the LEDGER’s statement:

“(…) it is highly unlikely for an unsuspecting sophisticated attacker to guess that a second PIN is enabled, providing that you give the first PIN to the attacker, and not possible to brute force one PIN knowing another one.”

However, to be fair it has to be admited that someone could be also forced to sell own house or empty bank account and give that money away, even without torture (e.g. by serious threats, made against that person or close relative). There is no absolute protection in any state if someone wants to kill or seriously harm somebody and lenient penalty policy, coupled with long and inefficient law enforcement proceedures in some states (most of them, I would say) are unlikely to be deterrent in this regard. On the other, more beneficial side, it can be observed that it is not very likely that ordinary person would be tortured or being threaten in order to get information about possible hidden LEDGER’s wallet, at least not without the attackers having reason to believe that the victim has a large sum of money.

I see the value of this possibility/feature in that that:

  • gives the opportunity to use the first/main wallet for regular daily purchases and maintain the bigger amount in the second wallet even if someone managed to intercept the PIN of the first wallet or the device being stolen;
  • gives the possibility to have bigger amount available in the hidden wallet, if and when needed (e.g. on vacation) from which the assets could be gradually transferred to the main wallet “in privacy”,
  • if the device would be stolen, the assets in the secret wallet would be transfered to the wictim’s new account, even if the main wallet’s PIN would be compromised (most convinient from the twin Ledger Nano S device, kept at another location, by thrustworthy person.

For those, who have grat value stored in a hard wallet device
I would advice to have at home a very big number of devices (best equal, since different devices have differently long PIN number), all activated (and all, but the “major one” also loaded with some small amount - if never used device could be somehow detected).

The devices, if looking the same, should also be marked (e.g. by numbers, or by Chinese/Japanese/Arabic characters),
and the coresponding files with PINs should also be marked, but differently.

However, it would be crucial that the owner would be able to memorise the marker of the device and the marker of the corresponding PIN, with the high amount of assets (one, two or three of them).

In this regard it would be helpfull that devices would be kept in more bowls of different shapes/colours and safe from children. The files with PINs could also be kept in more maps with different colours, as well as SEEDs in a (bank or home) safe. The later would help owner to memorise/detect the seeds for the device with the major amount of assets, and majority of them would prolong time in which the thief would be able to restore the wallet with the great amont of value (if safe would be compromised).

The number of files with PINs and also SEEDs could be even much greater that the number of devices and, coupled with LEDGER Nano S “secret wallet” possibility, would provide enough combination considerably decrease the risk of successful disposal of crypto assets, even when hard wallet devices and PINs would be stolen.

Even if SEEDs would be compromised, the prolonged proces of searching for “the high amount wallet” would increase the owner’s chance to successfuly transfer the assets before being done so by the thief.

Just imagine how desperate a thief would be if, entering a victim’s home, would found many bowls with a few hundred devices altogether (e.g. one having 100 bilj ADA and others 1 ADA) and a map with the same or even bigger number of marked PINs. And managed to open the safe, there would also be a notebook with huge number of numbered pages with different SEEDs.:roll_eyes.(My first insertion ever, I hope the words will be displayed as the chosen picture - which should, by my understanding, showed astonishment).

In the LEDGERS explanation, I have not understand the second part of the sentence:
As each PIN is using its own independent counter and
PIN comparison is constantly done,

and was unpleasantly surprised by the information:
“But take care, these plausible deniability features are delicate to manage, as you are the only one to know a multitude of codes. if you ever lose them, Ledger nor anyone will be able to recover them for you. Do not activate this option if you are not absolutely sure to understand it.”

The above paragraph I have understood as that the LEDGER would not be able to recover “multitude codes” (I guess this means seeds and/or PIN for additional wallets), but it would be able to recover (when “the secret feature” IS NOT ACTIVATED) the main wallet, which, if I understand that correctly, that the Ledger Nano S’s seeds and/or PIN is (potentially) known to at least some of the LEDGER’s personell. Let’s hope, that only to the honest ones.

Thanks for the above answer you have provided,
safe crypto keeping and a pleasant day