Options for compromised Cardano wallets

Hi, all.

Got scammed a while ago and my private keys were compromised. I still have airdrops due, but presumably the scammers have an auto-drainer targeting the wallet. I was wondering if Cardano has any security features I can enable to stop an automated transfer.

Given they’re not actively looking at my wallet and it appears the drainer is not so sophisticated to drain anything more complex than basic balances, I could imagine a secondary layer that requires something like a special signing to approve an operation. I was wondering if anything already existed in this domain on Cardano. As I understand it, SecondFi users have the same issue.

Thanks in advance!

No, there is nothing available, especially not after the fact.

The sender of the airdrop would have to change the target address if they are willing and able to.

Otherwise, you will have to try and sniper the airdrop before your attacker can get it.

Thanks @HeptaSean .

Guess I’ll try the speed run…
I wonder if there’s a value proposition in having a sub encryption layer that can still allow you to use a wallet with the main private key and a secondary key or phrase.

Probably nothing that can be done retroactively for existing wallets.

And all solutions would require massive changes to all existing dApps because suddenly it’s not enough to just ask a wallet app for a signature, but you have to potentially do much more complex workflows.

Could add some key disabling and switching to Cardano’s base. But I somehow doubt that the relevant people could be convinced to actually do that and make that base much more complicated and completely change the meaning of addresses (which are now just hashes of the key or script that is allowed to spend, withdraw, stake, …).

Could add at least the possibility to refuse accepting transactions (which was proposed more often to prevent malicious incoming transactions … they can’t do technical harm on Cardano, but they can do administrative harm, e.g., when connected to crime, sanctioned countries, …).
But that won’t help that much in the case of compromised keys because the attacker can then also accept and deny incoming transactions and you are in a sniper contest again. And even if you could prevent the airdrop from coming to the compromised address/account/wallet, you’d still need the sender of the airdrop to send it somewhere else. But if you can do that, you don’t need to refuse on the original address in the first place.

Without changing anything in Cardano’s core, it’s already rather simple to always require multiple signatures to spend from an address even with simple scripts, but alternatively also with Plutus. But, as said above, the vast majority of dApps are not prepared to handle those setups and it’s also rather cumbersome to handle as a daily driver. And if a common enough scheme emerges, attackers could just try to grab all secrets while they are at it if you always need all of them for each everyday transaction.

With Plutus, you could also implement something more fancy. E.g., a configuration NFT that decides if the original key is still allowed or if the secondary key needs to be used. If the original key is compromised, the secondary key can be used to change that configuration to disable the original for good. That is interesting, but, again, your wallet app and every dApp you want to use needs to be aware of how that works, that the configuration NFT has to be present, that a signature from original or secondary key needs to be requested depending on the configuration, that collateral for script execution is needed, …

Does anybody have any more solution sketches?