Risk of malware/virus attacking OS of critical number of verifying nodes?

What is the risk of a malware / virus infecting the operating system of a critical minority of node(s) performing transactions or verifications on Cardano? Are there any mitigations in the blockchain or node software to prevent such an attack, or to allow for disaster recovery of the blockchain ledger as a result of such an attack?


thats a good question sir,like to hear it from a expert on this🤔

New seperation and inheriting intergrity requires compute level auth at one point blockchainlike comput ~>network-auth-integrity; its why i definitely propose ordering all nodes operation via the network governance, harbinging a cliche of central mirror even, [pretty obtuse reasoning; or >50% network stabilizing the sea of interconnections.(was thinking ah here goes)]> thus some type of cryptographic methods, hash distribution, we’re out of a trust relation 'wever; whole internet could be spoofed at this point with all the hazes of 0-days; Existential question.

Holding in my head still this, for survival of the 'tegrity:
hashing all computation at 2ndary hardware level for malicious computation. TPM2.1, has been hacked so my thesis is hard to get right apparently.
and desyncing the network of cardano space asap and driving our own line with some filtered surpass to web1-2.0. right?

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This is what hoskinson gets at with staked value pooling right, and making unfeasible any change in library code :" ! I’m not sure if the second is harboured yet.

Beside the issue of value loarding; which could malefface the network;

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