Yes, I agree, but I was referring the size of the pool and not the number of pools and both make sense.
So, these two would reduce the surface attack that Sebastian’s mentioned as pools would not have too much space to grow. So, they just could incentive the stakeholders to a certain degree which is 1/k (percentage) of the all delegated stakes, means if there are only 50 pools then max. 2% of the all delegated stakes can be delegated to that pool. So, I would not expect too much pool competition as the delegate rewards should be static across the pools.
But, I am not sure how they will bootstrap Shelley as currently every stake is automatically delegated to the IOHK’s dedicated core nodes. So, I think when new pools are getting registered all stakes will evenly be distributed to the pools until they reach the k number. Only after this, the stakeholders would be allowed to delegate their stakes to the pools directly.
Of course these above based on the following assumptions:
- defined number of pools (k)
- defined max allowable stakes delegated to a pool (1/k)
- pools must be registered
- Initially, evenly distributed stakes between pools
- rewards are paid automatically by the protocol.
- rewards are paid in the next epoch
- block generating rewards are paid to stakeholders directly
- transaction rewards are paid to the stakeholders directly
- rewards for pools are automatically deducted from the stakeholders’ rewards and paid directly to the delegates/pools
- Pool reward is global and can only be adjusted by the protocol and not by individual pools
- pools do not need to have stakes on the Core node (to protect the Core nodes for leaking private keys)
- pools need to be punished somehow (despite 11.)
I am curious how many of my assumptions would hold in Shelley. I would say only 30%.