What % of ADA does a stake node pool need currently be have a chance to elected?

Is the required minimum of ADA delegated to a pool to be short listed for slot leader election fixed ?
If so what is it? if not how and where (in what paper) is it defined?

It’s a function of total amount of ADA staked - right now it’s pushing ~3M ADA for a pool to mint one block per epoch on average. With that being said, a pool with any amount of staked ADA can be elected as slot leader. For example, a pool with 1M ADA staked might on average see a block every 3rd epoch or so.


I thought they were a minimum amount of staked ADA necessary to take part in the election to avoid someone doing an attack by flooding the election system with stake pools with no stakes.

@ADAfrog mention a function of the total amount of AD staked. What function is it?

One last question, I see a lot of post about rewards but they all mention a ROI % over a year period. I understand that rewards are epoch based and probably shared proportionately to the number of block minted (therefore to the staked ADA), but what is the ADA amount shared (in absolute value or % of stakes) for each epoch ?

Stake pools with no stake aren’t a problem. But single operator or coalition of operators having more than 51% of all Cardano staked to their pools opens the door for what’s called a Sybil attack.

I think perhaps you may be confusing pool operator pledge with stake. Pledge is an arbitrary amount of ADA an operator locks up with their pool to help secure the network. If the pool pledge drops below the amount specified in the current pool registration certificate, then the pool and all the pools delegators will lose all rewards until the pledge is met - which can be achieved by either adding funds to the pool pledge wallet or by re-registering the pool to reduce pledge to a threshold met within the pledge wallet and wait for that new registration to take effect. Operators are incentivized to increase pledge with increased pool rewards, and the effect of pool pledge on rewards has more impact the larger the ratio of pledge is compared to total pool stake

Total amount of ADA staked is all ADA staked by all delegators across all stake pools.

ROS/ROI are terms commonly used for delegators. I’m not sure exactly what the rewards will look like yet, but I do know it will be a bit different from the ITN. Individual delegator rewards will be paid based on stake % in the pool vs rewards for the pool (same as ITN), but the pools block performance vs their expected performance calculated from total pool stake is what will determine pool rewards.

A pool can mint a block with 1 ADA pledged and 100 ADA staked - might take a few years, but totally possible.

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You are right that I was confusing pledge and stack.

But the attack I talking about is not the Sybil attack. I can’t recall the exact name but it goes as follows: registering billions of stake pools with a minimal pledge to disturb the election process ?
To avoid it there must be a minimal pledge.

I see - That’s where the pool registration fee come in (500 ADA). Right now one could register billions of pools with no pledge, but the 500 ADA pool registration fee mitigates that behavior

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With just under 100 pools registered (this could be higher by now) it would cost only 500 000 ADA to set up those 1000 malicious pools. Lets say there were 50M ADA put into this and 100 000 pools were created. Will this badly affect parts of the system… for example will daedalus cope with that?

We have 876 pools currently registered to be exact.

1000 malicious pools registered with no/minimal pledge and $50M in ADA stake dispersed would not harm the system

Daedalus is a 3rd-party wallet, and technically is not part of “the system” - therefore, how the Daedalus GUI manages heavier pool load has no effect on the blockchain

What about 100 000 more pools over 99% of all pools, yes thats a lot of money? But being super paranoid there are governments for whom that kind of investment to harm us might be chicken feed.

Also whilst Daedalus, Yoroi etc arent technically part of “the system” they are how almost all users will stake their ADA so if they go down thats a problem.

I’m not entirely sure, but I find comfort in the fact numerous PhDs have thought this through and the protocol has been deemed provable secure via academic peer review. I don’t think it would be a problem without some substantial stake tied to each pool. Also, this type of adversarial activity would be mitigated significantly as the price of ADA increases - just the pure nature of purchasing that much ADA would drive prices upwards.

On the client side, Daedalus and Yoroi would adapt - they always have and always will. While not ideal, it would be exceptionally simple to filter displaying pools that have a pledge below a certain threshold as well as pools not meeting their declared pledge.