This post is for discussing how many stake pools will be operational at launch.
For clarity I have attached official material below that supports this discussion.
If you have other material that should appear in this masthead, please let me know, and I will add them to this list.
2018-08-06 Charles Hoskinson, pscp.tv Cardano Update
Time 08:32 - 08:47
Our hope is to have lots of stake pools, in fact, the latest number we’ve been batting around is over one-thousand, and our hope is to try and make the protocol as decentralized as possible, and as efficient as possible, and we’re really happy about the overall design.
Configuration of stake pools
For maximal efficiency and security, a solid majority of stake (about 80%) should be delegated to a number of stake pools (about 100 seems to be a reasonable number).
The stake pools should be online when needed, and they should provide relay nodes, which are additional network infrastructure. The remaining proportion of stake (about 20%) should belong to “small” stakeholders, who can decide to either participate in the protocol on their own or to simply do nothing.
Reward Sharing Schemes for Stake Pools pdf
Our objective is to have a given number of equal-weight coalitions, which contrasts with the typical question in cooperative game theory on how the values of the coalitions are distributed (e.g., core or Shapley value) in such a way that the grand coalition is stable .
It should be clear that for appropriate values of the parameters, there is incentive for the stake holders to form pools so that they can share the cost. Ideally, we want to find a reward function that, at equilibrium, it leads to the creation of the desired number of almost equal-stake pools independently of (i) number of players (ii) the distribution of stake and costs (iii) the degree of concurrency in selecting a strategy (iv) more forward-looking play, that is, non-myopic play as opposed to best-response.
For example, a player who considers creating a new pool can estimate how much stake he can attract, given the current distribution of stakes and pools.
This seems like an impossible task7, so we have to settle for solutions that achieve the above goals approximately under some natural assumptions about the distribution of stake and costs and about the equilibria selection dynamics.
In simple terms, the reward function r essentially has to satisfy two properties: it should be increasing fast for small values to incentivize players to join together in pools to share the cost, and it should be constant for large values to discourage the creation of large pools or equivalently to incentivize the breakup of large pools into smaller pools.
By induction on the number of the pools to which j allocates stake, we can prove in the same way that j ’s utility will not increase if he dissolves his pool.
Note that the number of pools to which j allocates stake does not have an impact on desirability and ranking of the pools, because in all cases (i) there exist k − 1 active pools with positive desirability (j has dissolved his own pool) and (ii) desirability, which determines ranking, does not depend on pool size.
Note that the ranking of the pools also does not change in this case, because the desirability does not depend on pool size and the number of the active pools remains the same.