Staking is not lending out your Ada for interest payment. Staking is no different to voting.
Every time a pool produces a block all the stakers of that pool are collectively approving that block. In essence they are telling the rest of the Cardano network: We sign this block with the pool keys and this decision is supported by the weight of our collective stake.
Cardano security is built upon this assumption. It is a pivotal assumption that protects Cardano against double spending. The assumption is that so long as greater than 50% of participants, by stake weighting, act honestly then double spending can’t happen. Newer technologies like Mithril have further extended the dependence upon this critical assumption. Mithril permits faster block confirmation since if greater than 50% of participants by stake weighting agree a block, the protocol affirms that this block cannot get forked out.
But this crucial assumption starts to unravel a bit when the stakers are not actually approving the blocks.
Obviously, it is unreasonable to expect all stakers of a pool to be awake and online every second of the day in order to approve every block their pool produces. Thus Cardano has automated the mechanism to produce and sign blocks. Only the pool operator checks the blocks by running the protocol, and all the stakers have vouched with their staking keys that they trust this operator will faithfully perform the protocol. Nevertheless the assumption remains that the stakers of a pool continue to approve of that pool operator’s performance every time a block is made.
This is exactly like voting for a political representative. Unless you are a political animal, you are probably not going to want to know about every decision your representative takes, nor hear every negotiation, nor read every argument about every topic. You haven’t got time, you have your own life issues to deal with. This is why you vote to appoint a political representative who you believe will act to protect your interests. But we all know that people change, and their views change, over time. So you might want to change your appointed representative next election. But see; that is the key. Every democratic system has term limits for exactly this reason. No democratic system thinks it is a good idea to have participants lock in support for a representative in an unbounded manner, to automate away the voting process… forever. Every democratic system has term limits and participants are required to actively re-affirm their chosen representative, by voting.
Staking is no different. We need term limits.
These are some questions I have been pondering while trying to understand how much “sticky stake” might compromise Cardano’s consensus:
- What percentage of new users select a stake pool without knowing anything about the pool just from the front page of their wallet? What percentage simply follow a youtube recommendation? 10%, 20%, 30%.
- How will that percentage change over time as the staking yield reduces towards 2% or less.
Won’t care factor reduce as rewards reduce? - What sort of pools are likely to capture the most “sticky stake”? IE: Capture the stake that does’t care what happens and won’t re-stake, or the stake that is more likely to lose their keys through inattention to detail / general disinterest.
Is it the youtuber with the big mouth pumping meme coins, or the youtuber talking about technical design features deep in the weeds? What about the pool that doesn’t use youtube advertising? - What happens if the pool operator decides to sell his pool keys to someone else because he sees some other chain has better memes?
- How much are his pool keys worth if he has more “sticky stake” that won’t move when fees are increased?
- If a multi-pool operator has lots of “sticky stake” doesn’t this give him more options to split his pools and charge different fees on different pools? Doesn’t the “sticky stake” give this pool operator a competitive advantage that was not envisaged by the protocol designers?
- If a pool operator wanted to optimise for accumulating “sticky stake” how might he go about this?
Maybe start off with one pool and a gimmicky youtube channel presented by a celebrity to attract the hype crowd. Then after a while you spit the pool and charge a higher fee on the original pool and much lower on the new pool. Rinse and repeat. Each time you split and charge a higher fee on the original pool you hive off the “sticky stake” in that pool, but you continue to accumulate new entrants in the new pool with lower fees. You can afford the lower fee on your new pool because you are profiting from the “sticky stake”, plus you get economies of scale from multiple pools using the same infrastructure.
I think we should consider term limits on staking, which is really consensus vote delegation, just like there should be term limits on governance vote delegation. IE: When you stake you sign that you support a stake pool for a finite period of time. After this period of time your approval for this pool as your representative for blockchain consensus expires and you need to re-stake or re-affirm your pool selection.
And what’s even better is that having term limits can actually improve the staking yield for active participants. If we no longer reward the sticky stake that does nothing, and actually contributes negatively by making Cardano less “anti-fragile”, then there can be more rewards allocated to the active participants.